A popular approach to monothematic delusions in the recent literature has been to argue that monothematic delusions involve broadly rational responses to highly unusual experiences. Campbell (2001) calls this the empiricist approach to monothematic delusions, and argues that it cannot account for the links between meaning and rationality. We begin by clarifying the empiricist approach to delusions, and go on to argue that Campbell’s attack on such approaches fails.
Marraffa, M. (2004). The Empiricist Approach to Delusion: Clarification and Defense. SISTEMI INTELLIGENTI, 16(2), 223-236.
The Empiricist Approach to Delusion: Clarification and Defense
MARRAFFA, MASSIMO
2004-01-01
Abstract
A popular approach to monothematic delusions in the recent literature has been to argue that monothematic delusions involve broadly rational responses to highly unusual experiences. Campbell (2001) calls this the empiricist approach to monothematic delusions, and argues that it cannot account for the links between meaning and rationality. We begin by clarifying the empiricist approach to delusions, and go on to argue that Campbell’s attack on such approaches fails.File in questo prodotto:
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