Plotino e il dualismo nell’interpretazione di Ugo Bianchi

This paper focuses on Ugo Bianchi’s reading of Plotinus as a representative of the category of ‘dualism’. Plotinus’ polemics against the Gnostic rejection of the physical world notwithstanding, Bianchi emphasises that dualist features are typical of Plotinus’ views about principles, the soul and derivation. Therefore, Plotinus can be set in parallel with the Gnostics, despite his overt criticism of them. In this article, Bianchi’s reading is placed under scrutiny and some problematic issues are raised. Both Plotinus’ account of derivation and his view about the superior soul strongly militate against a dualist reading. The situation is, however, more complicated than this, as shown by those passages where Plotinus regards the derivation of Intellect and soul as an act of arrogance (tolma). An internal tension seems to emerge, then, between such aspects of Plotinus’ philosophy. Bianchi’s reading proves illuminating insofar as it emphasises the potential inconsistency between Plotinus’ programmatic anti-dualism and other features of his thought.