



Rediscovering Greek Institutions

New Institutional Approaches
to Ancient Greek History

Edited by Matteo Barbato, Mirko Canevaro and Alberto Esu

NEW APPROACHES TO ANCIENT GREEK INSTITUTIONAL HISTORY

Rediscovering Greek Institutions

New Approaches to Ancient Greek Institutional History

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Deliberative Institutions, Political Culture and Society from Classical to Hellenistic Iasos

Roberta Fabiani

In this chapter, I return with pleasure to the topic of deliberative procedure in Iasos in Caria.¹ My 2015 study offered a general reconstruction of it and its transformation from the Classical to the Hellenistic period. I am still convinced that the core of those findings is correct, however stimulating the occasionally critical reactions have been. Nevertheless, a recent essay by Pierre Fröhlich,² some further reflection on my part, as well as the interpretative tools offered by New Historical Institutionalism (NHI) encourage a more detailed investigation into the political-institutional history of Iasos. Above all, I would like to examine the changes that occurred within a broader and deeper historical framework that takes into consideration the precedents of the fifth century BC and underlines the complex dialectical relationship between institutions, political culture and society.

NHI emphasises the historical reading of institutional data; in other words, the way institutions depend on the context of their creation, how they adapt and endure and the importance of diachrony.³ Starting with March and Olsen's seminal essay,⁴ NHI scholars also stress the central importance of institutions, rules and procedures, highlighting how they shape political behaviour.

¹ Preparatory papers include Fabiani 2010, 2012 and 2015a: 279–305. An earlier, less systematic attempt at historically interpreting the procedure was offered by Carlsson 2010: esp. 296–302 (on which see Hamon 2009); see also Delrieux 2005: 176–7. My warmest thanks go to the editors of this book for their invitation to return to a subject so dear to me.

² Fröhlich 2021. Observations on Fabiani 2012 and 2015a are in Fröhlich 2013; Ma 2013; Bresson 2016b; Errington 2016; Hamon 2016; Boffo 2019.

³ For an introduction to NHI, see Sanders 2006; Fioretos, Falletti and Sheingate 2016a; Canevaro 2019b: 485–91; Esu 2024: 26–37.

⁴ March and Olsen 1984.

As Douglass North writes, ‘institutions are the rule of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction’.⁵ According to Peters, institutions are social phenomena that produce ‘patterned interactions that are predictable’.⁶ NHI thus posits that a collective sentiment, an *ethos* of institutions is shared and considered authoritative by the members of the social or political group that they represent.⁷ This can elicit correct behaviour according to a ‘logic of appropriateness’ (and for this reason it inflicts penalties on those who do not comply).

For NHI political scientists, the moment when a given institutional structure is formed is crucial. They observe that structures emerge at ‘critical junctures’.⁸ These are defined by Giovanni Capoccia as ‘events and developments in the distant past, generally concentrated in a relatively short period, that have a crucial impact on outcomes later in time’.⁹ The political decisions made during these times shape the institutions profoundly, bestowing them with an *ethos* that guarantees their essential stability according to the principle of path dependence. A ‘logic of appropriateness’ and the difficulties involved in change create a tendency for institutional structures to perpetuate themselves. Institutions are ‘sticky’: they maintain and replicate themselves, influencing subsequent developments. As Capoccia puts it, ‘many institutional arrangements are path-dependent, namely [they] give rise to endogenous mechanisms of reproduction and positive feedback that sustain them and keep them in place, limiting or bounding change’.¹⁰ In short, institutions can exercise constraint over political, collective and individual action, also in the long term.¹¹

All these concepts are enormously useful for understanding the development of deliberative procedure at Iasos between the Classical and Hellenistic periods. Therefore, I would again like to discuss in this light the institutional data relating to Iasian deliberative procedure and relative magistratures. We will see that at a ‘critical juncture’ in the fifth century BC, the *politeia* of Iasos defined itself according to principles aimed at stimulating the active participation of the entire citizenry, but also reserving leading roles for its upper

⁵ North 1990: 3.

⁶ Peters 2019: 19.

⁷ Esu 2024: 30–7.

⁸ NHI also identifies some forms of gradual institutional evolution: see Fioretos, Falleti and Sheingate 2016b: 12–14; Thelen and Conran 2016; Mahoney, Mohamedali and Nguyen 2016: 80–2.

⁹ Fioretos, Falleti and Sheingate 2016b: 10–12; Mahoney, Mohamedali and Nguyen 2016: 77–80; Capoccia 2016.

¹⁰ Capoccia 2016: 99.

¹¹ North 1990: 3; ‘(Institutions) structure incentives in human exchange, whether political, social, or economic. Institutional change shapes the way societies evolve through time and hence is the key to understanding historical change’. See also Fioretos, Falleti and Sheingate 2016b: 11–14.

and upper-middle strata. During the Hecatomnid age some aspects of the relevant *ethos* became blurred, but the ‘stickiness’ of the underlying institutions and dynamics of path dependence fostered its revival (c. 300–250 BC). New rules enacting another great traditional concern in Iasian political culture (as in Greek political culture more widely), respect for the *nomos*, then favoured a gradual decline in popular participation by the late third century, also due to the constraints that institutions themselves can exert.

The political institutions of Iasos can be investigated thanks to the prescripts of 112 (mostly honorary) decrees. These reveal an important cross-section of Assembly and Council life and offer a considerable amount of data. Alongside a diachronic analysis of the data on institutions, I think it is fundamental to consider prosopographical aspects,¹² which offer information about the social status (and sometimes the political orientations) of the protagonists of deliberation. As the NHI conceptual toolbox suggests, the idea of ‘institution’ is multifaceted. It is made up of both formalised rules and constitutional mechanisms, as well as informal norms and discursive and social practices.¹³ For this reason, for a fuller understanding of any change, we must not neglect who the protagonists themselves were.

I. IN SEARCH OF THE *ETHOS* OF IASIAN INSTITUTIONS: *DEMOS*, *BOULE* AND *PRYTANEIS*

To identify the *ethos*, the intrinsic spirit of the institutions of Iasos, we need to examine the entities that had the most important roles in the deliberative process: the *demos*, *boule* and *prytaneis*.

I.1. *Demos*

We have information on the activities of the Assembly (*demos*) of Iasos from the end of the fifth century BC to the fourth AD.¹⁴ From the fifth century, I believe, but certainly from the late fourth, the Assembly met on the sixth day of every month, though the *prytaneis* could convene extraordinary meetings.¹⁵ Starting from the beginning of the third century BC (see below) and for an indeterminate period of time, a certain number of citizens were paid to participate in the Assembly. From the 30s of the third century some decrees record

¹² On the chronology of the decrees, see Fabiani 2015a (four new texts to be published do not change this framework); on prosopography see Fabiani 2012.

¹³ On the coexistence of material and symbolic aspects in institutions, see Thornton, Ocasio and Lounsbury 2012: 10–11.

¹⁴ Fabiani 2012: 111–18; 2015a: 279–80.

¹⁵ Certain in *I.Iasos* 4.35–6, uncertain in Maddoli 2007, no. 25.A2, 2.

votes by secret ballot. The figures are quite high: 841, 758 (or 858), 1011, 1022 (or 1102).¹⁶ Such numbers in a small town indicate participatory assemblies that were open to all free adult males of Iasian origin.

1.2. *Boule*

Information on the activities of the Council (*boule*) of Iasos is available from the Hecatomnid era to the fourth century AD.¹⁷ At least from c. 250 BC, the *bouleutai* met in a *bouleuterion*.¹⁸ In Iasos, as elsewhere, the Council examined issues that were later subject to deliberation by the *demoi*. The *boule* generally expressed a preliminary opinion, and this was usually accepted: the non-probouleumatic enactment formula is extremely rare.¹⁹ The Council was supported in its work by a *grammateus*.²⁰

In the case of the *boule* too, some late third-century decrees record the number of votes: 68, 83, 90–99 and 111.²¹ It is probable that the Council comprised a fixed number of representatives per tribe. The maximum number of votes attested in the Hellenistic period was 111 and there were five *phylai* at that time (see below), which suggests that each *phyle* sent 25 people on a regular basis.²² The number of *bouleutai* was thus relatively high considering the modest size of Iasos, indicating a Council that was representative of the entire community. The proportions are similar to those for Athens, where 500 *bouleutai* are matched by the expected participation of 6,000 citizens. In Iasos we find over a hundred *bouleutai* out of a thousand *ekklesiastai*. These numbers suggest a distinctive *ethos* of democracy in the Iasian constitution and a Council, like the Assembly, that was largely open to popular participation.

¹⁶ In *SEG* 41.932, 13–14; *SEG* 41.929, 35 and Maddoli 2007, no. 20.B, 21–2; Blümel 2007, 2 II, 40–1 respectively. On the votes recorded at Iasos in a work aimed at demonstrating how attempts were made to reach unanimous rather than majority decisions in Greek assemblies, see Canevaro 2018d: 110–13.

¹⁷ Fabiani 2012: 119–22; 2015a: 280.

¹⁸ *I.Iasos* 55, 2.

¹⁹ Fabiani 2015a: 25–6.

²⁰ *I.Iasos* 23, 15–16. Fabiani 2015a: 27–8.

²¹ In *SEG* 41.932, 10–12; *SEG* 41.929, 34–5 and Maddoli 2007, no. 20.B, 20–1; *I.Iasos* 28, 4–5; Blümel 2007, 2 II, 39–40 respectively.

²² On the size of the *boule*, see Fabiani 2015a: 280; Müller 1995: 43 proposes 100 members. One might also suggest that each *phyle* sent 30 *phyletai*, as for the *boule* set up by OR 121.9–12 in Erythrai: its 120 members had to be chosen by lot and no one could be a member twice in a four-year period.

1.3. *Prytaneis*

The *prytaneis* will be of primary focus in this chapter.²³ The inscription from the Hecatomnid period *I.Iasos* 1 (ll. 12–14) shows that a board of *prytaneis* consisted of six members. As their name and the formula ὁ δεῖνα ἐπρυτάνευε (attested only in the Hecatomnid era) suggest, they were the presiding board of the *demos* and *boule*. However, the same formula shows that this presidency was held by only one member at a time. Starting from the time of the Macedonian conquest, the president in office is indicated with the formula ὁ δεῖνα ἐπεστάται: when the clause is accompanied by the list of the names of the *prytaneis*, the *epistates* is among them. During the month of their presidency, the *prytaneis* had to coordinate all the meetings of the *boule*, the one scheduled Assembly and any other extraordinary meetings.²⁴

As mentioned above, Iasian assemblies met on a monthly basis. It follows logically that the six *prytaneis* of *I.Iasos* 1 made up the presiding board of the *demos* and *boule* for one semester. This bipartition of the year certainly occurred in the Hellenistic era (see below), but it is very likely – given the number of six – that it also occurred earlier: in accordance with the NHI, the evidence indicates a stability and stickiness of the institutions.²⁵ The number of Iasian *prytaneis* must therefore be seen in relation to the number of assemblies.²⁶ We will come back later to the lists of *prytaneis*, which over time attest numbers varying from three to eight members.²⁷

Decree *SEG* 36.983, which we will also examine later, attests a dual presidency of two brothers. However we interpret a dual presidency, the fact that two brothers jointly covered the role of *prytaneis* suggests that the *prytaneia* was an elective office. This is also confirmed by prosopographical analysis: in the first half of the third century BC it is clear that the office could be held more than once and brothers are found on different boards.²⁸ The *prytaneis* of Iasos thus do not constitute a committee of the Council, as in Athens, but a magistracy that presides over the work of the *boule* and *demos*.²⁹ Even if they

²³ On the *prytaneis*, see Busolt 1920: 476; Gschnitzer 1973: 794–5; Fabiani 2012: 124–5; 2015a: 281–2. Pace Hamon 2018, the two *prytaneis* mentioned in the decree of the *phyle* Fabiani 2017 are not similar to these *prytaneis*. I believe they are magistrates of the *phyle* (as argued also by Fröhlich 2021: 296).

²⁴ See also Fröhlich 2021: 301–2.

²⁵ See, among others, Ikenberry 2016: 543–4.

²⁶ See also Fröhlich 2021: 298–304.

²⁷ Fabiani 2015a: 29.

²⁸ Fabiani 2012: 136–7.

²⁹ Iasian *prytaneis* as a committee of the Council on the Athenian model: Gschnitzer 1973: 794–5; as an actual magistracy as in Rhodes: Busolt 1920: 476; Fabiani 2012: 154; 2015a: 281. Although only partially statistically significant, when we find in a decree the list of *prytaneis* and the name of the proponent, the latter is never one of the presidents: cf. e.g. *I.Iasos* 56.

are elected magistrates, prosopographical investigation reveals a general level of distinction for *prytaneis* up to the middle of the third century BC, but no systematic link to persons holding the major magistracies.³⁰ The position, therefore, would normally have been held by someone from a medium-high stratum of society.

The Iasian *prytaneis* undoubtedly had the task of convening the Assembly and could present their own motions in the *boule* and *demos*;³¹ indeed, over time the *πρυτάνεων γνώμη* became the most frequent type of motion in decrees. However, as presidents of Council and Assembly, in these two *fora* the *prytaneis* would have also had the task of presenting and discussing the agenda, managing the discussion, putting to the vote motions already prepared and any raised during the debate, as well as counting the votes.³² Whoever formally put a motion to the vote was legally responsible for it to adhere to the *nomos*: the presidents of the Assembly, as well as the proponents, are usually explicitly mentioned in the decrees precisely because they could be charged for potential illegality.³³ It is no coincidence that the entrenchment clauses of some laws foresaw sanctions for whoever put to the vote any motions counter to what was established in the text – in other words, illegal motions.³⁴ The role of the *prytaneis* was therefore highly honorific, but came with considerable responsibilities: alongside the proponents, they, more than anyone else, had to ensure that the motions presented for approval in the Council and Assembly complied with the *nomos*. This conferred on them a role as legal filters, and it is likely that throughout the Classical period this responsibility fell only to the president in charge. As we shall see, that responsibility seems to become collegial and increasingly formalised in the Hellenistic period.

The participatory *ethos* revealed by the number of Council members and by the participants in the Assembly is also confirmed, it seems, by the *prytaneis*:

While I consider the *prytaneis* an elective magistracy, I have never argued that they were elected on a census basis, as Fröhlich 2013: 563 claims I do.

³⁰ Fabiani 2012: 132–4, 136–7.

³¹ For the *prytaneis* summoning the Assembly cf. *I.Iasos* 4, 35–6: [πρυτ]άνεων ἐκκλησίαν συναγαγόντων τριακάδι. For a list of the motions presented by the *prytaneis*, see Fabiani 2015a: 28–9.

³² See also Fröhlich 2021: 296. The *prytaneis* can usefully be compared with the Athenian *proedroi*; on their role, see Canevaro 2018d: 126–31 and cf. Aeschin. 3.2–6. The *proedroi*, however, presided over the meetings for just one day and were appointed only shortly before the meeting of the Assembly. On the deliberative process in Athens and the role of the *proedroi*, see also Liddel 2020: 20–5.

³³ On the *epistatai* see Rhodes with Lewis 1997: 482. Cf. Aeschin 2.89. On the legal role of the proponent of a law in Athens, who was subject to being charged if the correct procedure was not followed, see Canevaro and Esu 2018: 128–9; Liddel 2020: 19.

³⁴ Cf. e.g. *IG I³* 46, 20 fols.; *IG XII* 7, 3, 38–42; *IG XII* 6, 1, 172, 88–90; *I.Mylasa* 1, 12–16; 2, 12–15; 3, 14–19; cf. also Dem. 24.54.

for a *polis* that met monthly and that could certainly ill afford – even if only for basic demographic reasons – a daily *epistates*, a board of 6–8 *prytaneis* per semester implies a significant number of citizens. The fact that the *prytaneis* were elective magistrates demonstrates another aspect of the *ethos* of the Iasian institutions, that is, the wish to create a balanced distribution of powers and honours, and to require the middle–upper strata of the citizen body actively to commit to the common good. In my opinion, however, the gradual development of the role of the *prytaneis* also reveals a third essential aspect of the *ethos* of Iasian institutions and of the Greek *polis* in general, namely a concern for respecting the *nomos*.

2. THE FIFTH CENTURY BC: IASOS, ATHENS AND THE DELIAN LEAGUE

A healthy concern with critical junctures – that is, crucial times when institutional structures take shape – has led some scholars to analyse historical events by returning to the period immediately before the crucial one.³⁵ I am in agreement with this approach, and will try to trace the origins of the *ethos* of the Iasian institutions mentioned above. Indeed, a critical juncture occurred in Iasos in the fifth century BC at the time of its accession to the Delian League. This was certainly a watershed event. Before joining Athens,³⁶ Iasos was a city that metaphorically (and in practice) spoke two languages.³⁷ Since the late Archaic period, the artistic language of the *polis* had been Greek, but the oldest inscriptions are in Carian.³⁸ Recently, Michele Loiacono has brilliantly suggested that the most important of these inscriptions, scratched on an Attic black-figure crater from the end of the sixth century BC (Adiego 2007, C.Ia 3), is a dedication to the god who, in Labraunda, according to Herodotus (5.119.2) was called Zeus Stratios, a central cult for the Carian ethnic identity.³⁹ At that time, therefore, a bilingual community was established in Iasos, deeply imbued with Greek culture and worshipping divinities that marked it as part of the Carian world.

³⁵ Capoccia 2016: 90.

³⁶ On the relations between Iasos and Athens see Fabiani 2020.

³⁷ On Carian–Greek bilingualism in Caria (trilingualism with regard to Persia), see Hdt. 8.133–5; Thuc. 8.85.2. Ephorus in Diod. Sic. 11.60.4 also speaks of Carian *diglossoi* communities. See, among others, Aubriet 2013: 190; Carless Unwin 2017: 43–7.

³⁸ Angiolillo 1994 and 1997; Berti and Masturzo 2000; Berti 2011; Landolfi 2009 and 2013. On Carian inscriptions from Iasos see Adiego 2007: 145–9.

³⁹ Loiacono 2019; see now Fabiani 2024. On Labraunda see Carless Unwin 2017: 200–5. A sanctuary of the double axes in the *agora* of Iasos recalls the cult of Labraunda: see Berti 2019.

Iasos then joined the Delian League and proved itself tenaciously loyal to Athens.⁴⁰ It remained in the League while the communities of inner Caria broke away,⁴¹ and Amorges, rebel to the Great King and ally of Athens whom Tissaphernes was ordered to capture dead or alive, chose to stay in the city from at least 413 BC.⁴² This did not end well: Iasos was conquered by the Peloponnesians and Persians, and Amorges was captured.⁴³ The alliance with Athens was therefore of central importance for the Iasians: apart from binding them to an important political ally, it also involved a certain ethnic-identity positioning. It meant declaring – and recognising – oneself as part of the Greek world and obscuring any form of belonging to the Carian world, probably in favour of an Ionian identity, a decisive *syngeneia* for the constitution and cohesion of the Athenian alliance.⁴⁴

Iasos later became a fully Hellenic city, systematically siding with the Greeks against the Persians (a Carian reorientation under the Hecatomnids proved ephemeral, as we shall see below). At the beginning of the fourth century BC, it adhered to the League documented by the so-called ΣΥΝ coins. This was led by Sparta, and Iasos supported King Agesilaus in his Asiatic expedition against the Persian Empire (396–394 BC).⁴⁵ However, the bonds with Athens were tenacious, especially if, like other scholars, we date to the first decades of the fourth century the decree by which the Athenians offered protection to some Iasians. They had had to leave their homeland due to their loyalty to Athens and three were appointed *proxenoi*.⁴⁶ The significance of this bond makes it reasonable to hypothesise that, after joining the Delian League, Iasos may have based its constitution on Ionian models and on Athenian principles

⁴⁰ This may have been the result of the extensive search for alliances carried out by Cimon before the Battle of the Eurymedon: see Fabiani 2004: 19–23. From 450 BC (*IG I³* 263, col. V.2, 21) Iasos appears regularly in the Athenian Tribute Lists (ten more times up to 415/4 BC: see Fabiani 2020: 2 fn. 12). In the first period Iasos paid one talent; with the redefinition of the *phoros* (*IG I³* 71) in 425/4 it paid three.

⁴¹ Meiggs 1972: 117–19, 306–7; Keen 1993; Briant 1996: 1000–1.

⁴² Thuc. 8.5.5.

⁴³ Thuc. 8.28.2–29.1; see Fabiani 2020: 4. The Athenians were aware of the gravity of these events: a few months later, Peisandrus proposed that Phrynichus be stripped of his position as *strategos* for having been responsible for the downfall of Iasos and Amorges (Thuc. 8.54).

⁴⁴ See, above all, Smarczyk 1990: 328–84; Constantakopoulou 2007: 66–75; Fragoulaki 2013: 209–48. The traditions regarding the origins of Iasos (Polyb. 16.12.2) were wholly or partly consolidated in this period: Iasos was an Argive colony, which, due to losses in the war with the Carians, was refounded by Miletus. See Raffaelli 1995; Biraschi 1999; Bresson 2009: 110–11.

⁴⁵ Fabiani 1999. For the ΣΥΝ coinage see now Psoma 2022 (as well as, for a different reconstruction, Kallet and Kroll 2020: 136–9).

⁴⁶ A copy found in Iasos largely integrates a fragmentary Athenian text; Maddoli 2001, text A (= *SEG* 51.1506); Fabiani 2001; *SEG* 51.67. On the dating, see Culasso Gastaldi 2004: 71–87; Simonton 2020. In Fabiani 2001 I suggested linking the decree to Amorges' exploits.

of broad civic participation. As we know, Athens often intervened in the domestic (also political) affairs of its allies.⁴⁷ For loyal Iasos, however, we should probably acknowledge one of those cases of spontaneous convergence that led the Thucydidean Pericles to boast of an imitation of the Athenian regime (Thuc. 2.37.1).

Imitation of Athenian institutions, however, was not total. The board of the chairmen of Council and Assembly, the *prytaneis*, were an elective *arche* in Iasos, and not, as in Athens, the representatives of a *phyle* in the *boule*. But the fixed date for the Assembly meetings, the sixth day of each month, is emblematic of the cultural and religious climate in which the Iasian political structure was shaped. Artemis was born on the sixth, the day before Apollo, and the two deities were central to the Iasian *pantheon*.⁴⁸ We know for certain that from the end of the fourth century BC the Assembly was held on the sixth day, but the role attributed to Apollo on local coinage – already from the fifth century – suggests that the date was traditional.⁴⁹ The two birth dates were certainly well known to all Greeks, but they clearly recall the tradition of the birth of Artemis and Apollo in Delos.⁵⁰ In short, the day chosen for the city Assembly implies that salient features of the Iasian political life were defined within a new religious and ethnic framework – no longer Carian, but Ionian and Delian – and thus most likely in the context of its alliance with Athens.⁵¹

This intense long-standing relationship with Athens and an admiration for the political life of a city that defeated the Persians might explain, I think, the democratic spirit we sense in Iasian institutions.

⁴⁷ On this, see Brock 2009. According to him (in contrast with a widely held belief that Athens methodically promoted democracy: see Brock 2009: 149), the Attic *polis* would not have systematically encouraged democratic institutions among its allies for ideological reasons: it would have acted pragmatically and adopted differentiated approaches.

⁴⁸ Fabiani and Nafissi 2023: esp. 373–7. On the date of the feasts of the twins Apollo and Artemis in Athens, see Mikalson 1975: 182–97. The Athenians avoided meetings on festival days but did not meet on fixed days. There were four meetings required by law, but extra meetings could be held. See Harris 2006: 103–20.

⁴⁹ Weiser 1985: 176–8; Ashton 2007; Fabiani and Nafissi 2023: 373–7.

⁵⁰ Milesian claims that the twins were conceived by Zeus and Leto at Didyma (*IG XII 4*, 153 = *Milet VI.3* 1052, 4–10) respected the Delian tradition.

⁵¹ Although selected differently, the Iasian *prytaneis*, with respect to the Council and Assembly, had both the power to set their agenda and to manage and control their meetings. This corresponds to the model of Athenian *prytaneis* in the fifth century: in the fourth the management of their meetings was entrusted to the *proedroi*. I owe this observation to Mirko Canevaro.

3. FROM LATE FIFTH TO THE END OF THE FOURTH CENTURY BC: THE HECATOMNID PERIOD AND THE OLIGARCHIC SHIFT

The most ancient decrees from Iasos (late fifth century – c. 370 BC) offer very little information:⁵² the prescripts are still at an embryonic stage and generally contain only the enactment formula. The decisions that survive are all probouleumatic.⁵³

3.1. The Hecatomnid Period

From the King's Peace on (387/6 BC), if not from the creation of the satrapy of Caria (392/1), Iasos was again under the control of Persia and the new satrapal dynasty founded by Hecatomnus.⁵⁴ A key moment in Iasian history was the so-called conspiracy against the satrap Mausolus (late 60s–early 50s), a *stasis* which concluded with the execution or exile of a certain number of citizens and the confiscation of their goods.⁵⁵ In the decree documenting this episode (*I.Iasos* 1), the Iasian community, worried about its relationship with the powerful satrap, showed that it was united and firm in condemning the conspiracy and produced a resolution which defined the incident as a plot, not only against Mausolus but against the *polis* itself ([τ]ῶν ἀν[δρ]ῶν τῶν ἐπιβουλευσάντων Μανσώλλωι καὶ τῆι Ἰασέων πόλῃι).⁵⁶ To underline the desire to condemn its guilty citizens, the community drew up a long list of magistrates involved in the sale of the confiscated assets: *archontes*, *tamiai*, *astynomoi*, *synegoroi*, *prytaneis*, *hiereis* of Zeus Megistos and thirty-four representatives of the civic body (οἶδε ἀπὸ φυλῆς).

This episode has to do with the takeover of the Hecatomnids in Caria. The new satraps promoted a strongly Cario-centric policy.⁵⁷ This was to produce a split within the city between citizens ready to accept a close Cario-Persian relationship with the satrapal power and others who objected to it in the name

⁵² This section refers to decrees in groups 1–2 as established in Fabiani 2015a: 252–5; see also 284–9.

⁵³ Fabiani 2012: 111–18; 2015a: 279–80. The earliest decrees present the formulas ἔδοξεν Ἰασεῦσι (Maddoli 2007, nos. 1.2; 1.4) or οἱ Ἰασεῖς ... ἔδωκαν (Maddoli 2007, no. 1.3; *SEG* 36.982A, 2–3) without any references to political bodies. The only example of the ἔδοξεν τῶι δήμῳ formula is recorded later in this period: Maddoli 2007, no. 6, 2 (end 4th).

⁵⁴ Diod. Sic. 14.98.3; on this event and the Hecatomnids, see Hornblower 1982: esp. 34–51 and, in brief, Müller 2013. On this period in Iasos, see Fabiani 2013; 2015b.

⁵⁵ Gehrke 1985: 75, 256, 270.

⁵⁶ For the reconstruction of the affair, see Fabiani 2015b: 51–8.

⁵⁷ Fabiani 2013; 2015b.

of Iasian Greekness and principles of freedom and independence. Evidence of opposition to the Hecatomnids emerges from the honorary decree *SEG* 36.983, proposed by Ἀναξαγόρας Ἀπολλωνίδου, one of the Iasians recently appointed *proxenoi* by Athens (see § 2).⁵⁸ As an Athenian *proxenos*, Anaxagoras was deeply bound to the Greek world and proposed honouring the three sons of a certain Peldemis, who are later known to have damaged a statue of Hecatomnus, father of Mausolus, in 361/0 BC. For this reason, the brothers – who were evidently opponents of the Hecatomnids – had their property confiscated (*I.Mylasa* 2). Anaxagoras' decree must predate 361/0 and the conspiracy in Iasos.⁵⁹ The decree presents an extraordinary situation – a double presidency of two brothers (Δημήτριος Ἀπολλωνίδου Δήμων ἐπρυτάνευον),⁶⁰ who are also brothers of the proponent – with a strong presence of the relatives of the Athenian *proxenos*. The resolution, with its anti-Hecatomnid stance, evidences a climate that anticipates the *stasis* to which *I.Iasos* 1 solemnly (and dramatically) testifies the end. The clash was resolved – not surprisingly – in favour of the pro-Hecatomnid group, which took control of the city.

From the Hecatomnid era, Iasian decrees become more complex. The pre-scripts open with information on the time of the resolution. However irregularly, the year is given by the name of the *stephanephoros*,⁶¹ the eponymous magistrate, and the meeting is identified by indicating that it took place ἐν ἀρχαιρεσίσαισι⁶² or in a specific month. While the day is not given (e.g. μηνὸς Ἀπατουριῶνος),⁶³ a monthly meeting is implied. The names of those chairing the Assembly (ὁ δεῖνα ἐπρυτάνευε)⁶⁴ and of the proponent of the resolution are recorded: in the Hecatomnid era this was always with the formula ὁ δεῖνα εἶπε.⁶⁵ Widespread practice suggests that in this formula the proposers are *bouleutai*.⁶⁶ In short, pre-scripts start including information that underlines the validity of the resolution; names are recorded both for honorific reasons and to define individual responsibilities. In fact, the proponent, together with the president who puts a motion to the vote, is legally responsible for the legality

⁵⁸ In Fabiani 2001 and 2015a: 212, I identified this Anaxagoras as a nephew of the Athenian *proxenos*.

⁵⁹ Fabiani 2015b: 56–8.

⁶⁰ Note the formula with the patronymic in the middle. For the two names, see the more complete later copy of decree (*SEG* 38.1059).

⁶¹ *SEG* 36.982C, 1–2.

⁶² *SEG* 36.982B, 2; *SEG* 36.983, 2–3. Gauthier 1993: 219–20: the electoral Assembly, the most attended, must have been a particularly propitious occasion for passing honorary decrees.

⁶³ *SEG* 36.982C, 2–3; *I.Iasos* 1, 1; *I.Iasos* 24+30 respectively (on this, see Fabiani 2007 = *SEG* 57.1085), 2. The day of the Assembly is also not indicated in *I.Iasos* 27 and *I.Iasos* 52: Fabiani 2015c.

⁶⁴ *SEG* 36.982B, 2–3; *SEG* 36.982C, 3; *SEG* 36.983, 3–4.

⁶⁵ *SEG* 36.982C, 3–4; *SEG* 36.983, 5–6.

⁶⁶ Rhodes with Lewis 1997: 491–7.

(as adherence to the *nomos*) of what is approved.⁶⁷ It is also worth noting that, despite being a member of a board, the president of the Assembly and Council is mentioned by name as the *prytanis* (ὁ δεῖνα ἐπρυτάνευε), which seems to indicate weak collegiality. Tasks, obligations and honours regard the president individually, rather than the whole board.

The inscription about the conspiracy (*I.Iasos* 1) also provides information about the city's magistrates. The most important were evidently the *archontes*, who head the list of the boards involved in the condemnation. These boards are evidently complete. The number four prevails, attested by *archontes*, *tamiai*, *synegoroi*, and must correspond with that of the city's *phylai*.⁶⁸ In contrast, there are six *prytaneis*: they must be the presidents of the Council and Assembly in the current semester (§ 1.3).⁶⁹ Moreover, the anthroponyms contained in the inscription tell us more about the political situation at that time. A fair number of people listed in the text belong to specific family groups. The *archontes* come from *gene*, which, in the same period or in subsequent generations, hold the office of *stephanephoros*, *hiereus* or *tamias*. In short, after the conspiracy it seems that Iasos was led by a small group of high-status families.⁷⁰

Alongside this, we should recall the reference to the *eunomia* in the dedicatory epigram on an honorary monument to the Hecatomnid family (*SEG* 63.876), perhaps specifically for Ada, who was sister, wife and heir of the satrap Idrieus.⁷¹ According to Nafissi's reconstruction,⁷² the city, at that time deeply integrated into the Carian *ethnos*,⁷³ bestowed the title of *basileis* upon the Hecatomnids and praised them for restoring 'good governance' (*eunomia*). In the political lexicon, *eunomia* signifies normative and social good order, often signalling a 'government of the best'.⁷⁴ It was now that concern about

⁶⁷ See § 1.3.

⁶⁸ Fabiani 2010: 477–80; 2015a: 279.

⁶⁹ There are two *astynomoi* (half of four). The eleven priests of Zeus Megistos must be the former priests to the god who were alive at the time plus the one in charge: see Loiacono 2019; Fabiani 2024: 364–5. It is also not necessary to see any numerical rationale for the thirty-four representatives of the *phylai*; they were probably convened as the sales procedure required.

⁷⁰ Fabiani 2012: 129–34; 2015b: 52–3. I base my observations only on the less frequent names in Iasos.

⁷¹ On the monument and its reconstruction, see Masturzo and Nafissi 2015; on the epigram: Nafissi 2015a and 2015b.

⁷² Nafissi 2015b: esp. 30–41.

⁷³ In a document probably dating back to 353/2 BC (*I.Mylasa* 11, in the crucial reinterpretation of van Bremen 2013), Iasian representatives, alongside envoys from other Carian communities, witness a sale of land between Cindye and Mylasa. Even if they were not present as members of the Carian *koinon* (as van Bremen 2013: 1–10 supposes; for a different opinion, see Fabiani 2015b: 55), the document shows Iasos as being part of the Carian world. In the Hecatomnid era Iasians usually honoured individuals from Carian communities: see Fabiani 2021: 192.

⁷⁴ Raaflaub 2006: 392. On *eunomia* in general, and in this context, see Nafissi 2013: 310–14; 2015a: 79–81. No evidence supports the idea of a democratic Iasos in the Hecatomnid era,

respect for the *nomos* probably assumed greater importance: a concern that later became more evident.

It seems to me that the following hypothesis can be advanced. The Hecatomnid seizing of power brought about changes everywhere in Caria, including Iasos, which affected culture, ethnicity and politics. It is known, for example, that the Hecatomnids promoted oligarchies in the communities under their control.⁷⁵ This external change produced in Iasian institutions what the New Institutional lexicon defines as drift, that is, the ‘changed impact of existing rules due to shifts in the environment’.⁷⁶ Without explicit reforms or changes in rules or institutions, the spirit of democratic participation receded in the city, and certain prominent family groups became dominant, perhaps also by virtue of personal relationships with the satraps. The (ostensible?) decrease in the number of decrees published might also be emblematic of this.

3.2. From the Macedonian Conquest to the End of the Fourth Century BC

With the Macedonian conquest of Iasos (334 BC), minor changes occurred in the structure of the prescript of the decrees. One of them, the introduction of the day of the Assembly – on the sixth of the month – probably relates to an improvement in archiving practices.⁷⁷ The decrees, which in earlier times opened with the enactment formula, now, with few exceptions, start with the name of the *stephanephoros*.⁷⁸ In the same period a new *phyle* was introduced, and, as a result, their number grew to five.⁷⁹ More significant is the introduction of a new formula for the presidency of the Assembly (and of the Council): ὁ δεῖνα ἐπεστάται. Paradoxically, this reveals a more collegial aspect to the *prytaneis*, since they are now conceived as a board with a rotating president. The first decrees that emerge from a *πρυτάνεων γνώμη* are emblematic of collegial activity.⁸⁰

In domestic politics, there must have been substantial continuity. Some families survived the shock of Macedonian liberation, including that of Gorgos and Minnion, the two most eminent personalities in the age of Alexander.⁸¹ In Caria there was no need for a profound change: the Hecatomnid Ada,

expressed by Hornblower 1982: 114 n. 64; Nawotka 2003: 24–5; Vacante 2011: 322. The principles of political, normative and social good order might have inspired the norms attested in a fragment of the Aristotelian *Iaseon Politeia* in the *excerpta* of Heraclides Lembus (73 Dilts).

⁷⁵ Hornblower 1982: 107–37; Schipporeit 1998: 223–4, 228–9.

⁷⁶ Fioretos, Falletti and Sheingate 2016b: 13.

⁷⁷ The oldest attestation is in Maddoli 2007, no. 5.

⁷⁸ On a possible reason for the change, see Fabiani 2015a: 287–8.

⁷⁹ The new *phyle* was probably dedicated to Alexander: Fabiani 2010: 477–80; 2015a: 279.

⁸⁰ Fabiani 2015a: 249, table 35; the first example is *I.Iasos* 52.

⁸¹ Fabiani 2015a: 286–7; 2015b: 59–64.

whose brother, Pixodarus, had wrested control of the satrapy from her,⁸² suggested that Alexander become her adopted son.⁸³ The Iasian supporters of Pixodarus – who had the name of Ada erased from the aforementioned epigram *SEG* 63.876 – were the perfect scapegoats. Acting wisely and embracing an anti-Persian policy, their adversaries were able to pass smoothly to the Macedonian side.

In the decrees of this latter part of the fourth century only *archontes* and *prytaneis* appear as proponents;⁸⁴ proposals of the ὁ δεῖνα εἶπε type are lacking. In this period, political initiative in the *boule* and the *demos*, thus, seems to be in the hands of both elective boards. Here too, there is continuity with the earlier period; political initiative remains in the hands of citizens of a high-social stratum. At this stage there are always fewer than six *prytaneis*, when listed. As Fröhlich recently suggested,⁸⁵ whether the list of *prytaneis* corresponds to how many there were when the motion was approved in the *boule* or to those present in the Assembly, it appears that members were allowed to miss meetings they were meant to attend and that they did not have to be substituted. This seems to signal an ill-functioning collegiality: there was no obligation to participate and perhaps less interest in being present for a *prytanis* who did not have the presidency.

4. BETWEEN THE END OF THE FOURTH AND THE FIRST HALF OF THE THIRD CENTURY BC: THE RETURN TO A MODERATE DEMOCRACY.

At the end of the fourth century BC, Iasos was involved in the violent struggles between the *diadochoi*. It was first under the control of Asandrus; then, in 313, of Antigonus Monophthalmus;⁸⁶ finally, between 309 and 305, Iasos was in alliance with Ptolemy (*I.Iasos* 2): the relationship with the Ptolemies continued over the following decades.⁸⁷

⁸² Strab. 14.2.17; Diod. Sic. 16.74.2. On Ada: Howe 2021.

⁸³ Arr. *An.* 1.23.8; Diod. Sic. 17.24.2–3; Strab. 14.2.17.

⁸⁴ Ἀρχόντων γνώμη: *I.Iasos* 27. Πρυτάνεων γνώμη: *I.Iasos* 52; Maddoli 2007, nos. 5; 6; 7; 8; 9; 10.

⁸⁵ Fröhlich 2021: 301.

⁸⁶ Diod. Sic. 19.75.5.

⁸⁷ On the long relationship with the Ptolemies, and the possible interruption of the dynast Eupolemus at the beginning of the third century (Fabiani 2009), see Fabiani 2021: esp. 198–202, 205–8.

In these final years of the century, changes are found in Iasian decrees.⁸⁸ Formulae are modified, and clauses are gradually augmented. More significant, however, is a reform implemented at the beginning of the third century BC.⁸⁹ Payment was introduced (*ekklesiastikon*) for any citizens attending the Assembly (*I.Iasos* 20 = RO 99). The *diadochoi* often promoted political reforms in the *poleis* under their control,⁹⁰ although this decree might also have been the result of an endogenous revival triggered by the participatory spirit of the institutions of Iasos: a case of path dependence. In this very damaged document, we read that the *tamiai* must pay the *neopoiai* [ἕκα]τὸν ὀγδοήκοντα (180 drachmas?) on ἐκάστου μηνὸς τῆ νουμηνία (the first day of every month) and that the *neopoiai* must display a water clock with specific characteristics ἐκάστου μηνὸς ἕκτη ἰσταμένου καὶ ταῖς [ἀρχαυ]εσίας (on the sixth day of each month and at elections). The Assembly in Iasos was held monthly and a wage was also paid to the *ekklesiastai* when the *archai* were elected.

The decree does not fix the amount to be paid to those who attend the Assembly, but it does indicate a spending cap. How can this be interpreted?⁹¹ In the fourth book of the *Politics*, Aristotle discusses the characteristics and organisation of different forms of government. *Politeia*, a temperate democratic government, requires bringing together oligarchic and democratic elements (Arist. *Pol.* 4, 1297a36–41), and it is thus necessary to pay the less well-off for attending the Assembly, and fine the rich who do not participate. Since the best deliberations are made by the elite and the people together, it is right that those who deliberate are present in equal numbers. Additionally, if poor people outnumber the elite, payment (for the Assembly) must be granted to a number of people equal to the number of the elite with any surplus representatives excluded by lot (Arist. *Pol.* 4, 1298b20–26). The specific spending limits envisaged by the Iasian decree can be explained within this framework. In accordance with the balanced *ethos* of the Iasian *politeia*, it aimed at ensuring adequate participation of the people in shared decisions,⁹² without falling into radical democratic excesses.

In this phase, the political life of Iasos seems to be democratic and participatory. Indeed, it is then that we find the greatest number of published decrees, and widespread opinion links democratic regimes with the practice of public writing.⁹³ Decrees are proposed by the widest range of officials: sometimes by *archontes*, and at other times by *prytaneis* or by *bouleutai* (ὁ δεῖνα εἶπε). Proposals

⁸⁸ I consider here the decrees in groups 3–6 in Fabiani 2015a: 255–63.

⁸⁹ I still believe that this was an actual reform, although Boffo 2019: 638 believes that I state this ‘with too much confidence’ (my translation).

⁹⁰ For this period, see cases 5, 6 and 7 in Bencivenni 2003: 105–202.

⁹¹ Fabiani 2015a: 289–91.

⁹² According to Gauthier 1990: 438–43, the pay was distributed to 360 citizens.

⁹³ Fabiani 2015a: 291 (and 285–6).

from the latter are now particularly frequent. Though some *bouleutai* were certainly very high-status individuals, we are unable to reconstruct family ties for approximately two thirds of them.⁹⁴ The proposals that come to the Assembly at this stage thus originate from both elected magistrates and *bouleutai*. The *boule*, according to the well-known definition of a scholion to Aeschines (3.4), is a 'small polis', and therefore where the *bouleutai* are numerous they can represent the entire civic body in the best way. Correspondingly, proposals made by the highest magistrates, the *archontes* – chosen from the most distinguished citizens – are very rare (*I.Iasos* 59). In short, the right of proposal in this period was exercised in a rather open way.⁹⁵

The *prostatai* are most likely a post-Hecatomnid creation, since they are absent from *I.Iasos* 1, and I suspect that their *arche* was created at this time.⁹⁶ What were their duties? In the payment of the *ekkleusiastikon*, they sealed the urns which contained the *pestoi* that citizens inserted. They therefore held the *demosia sphragis* and guaranteed the correctness of the procedure, perhaps also by assessing the civic status of the *ekkleusiastai*: it can be assumed that the *prostatai* kept the citizenship register. In the early years of the second century BC, *I.Iasos* 219 allowed any private citizen to report (*προσαγγεῖλαι*) the non-compliance of priests or magistrates in sacred matters to the *prostatai*:⁹⁷ evidently, they must have been endowed with judicial powers. In a contemporary text (*I.Iasos* 4), a letter from Laodice III, the queen entrusts the *prostatai* with the task of distributing dowries to the daughters of less well-off citizens from the proceeds of the sale of the grain she will send to the city:⁹⁸ again the *prostatai* act as guarantors of procedural correctness, and perhaps verify the rights of the beneficiaries in terms of their civic status and economic standing. The *prostatai*, occasionally with the *strategoï*, are also in charge of preparing the *prographai* for granting *politeia* to deserving foreign judges,⁹⁹ probably again as the keepers of citizenship registers.

Hamon is certainly right in observing that the *prostatai* of Iasos are largely reminiscent of controlling magistracies like the *exetastai* in other *poleis*.¹⁰⁰

⁹⁴ Fabiani 2012: 135; 2015a: 218 with n. 61, 219.

⁹⁵ Similar conclusions on the relative social status of *bouleutai* in Athens have been reached by Lambert 2018: 171–226.

⁹⁶ Fabiani 2015a: 282–3.

⁹⁷ Fabiani 2019.

⁹⁸ On this famous inscription, see Ma 1999: 180–1, 196–201, 329–35; Nafissi 2001.

⁹⁹ *I.Iasos* 73, 28–9, 56–7; 74, 26–7, 52–3.

¹⁰⁰ Hamon 2016. *Exetastai* (see Fröhlich 2004: 117–68, esp. 152–5) were often given judicial responsibilities; they had to take care of official documents and register new citizens in the civic lists. In some *poleis* (e.g. Parion, Chios, Erythrai) they also had the right to put motions forward. With respect to their judicial responsibilities, Hamon 2016 also draws analogies with the *dikaskopoi* of Aigai (Debord and Fröhlich 2018: 346, l. 24).

However, names are significant: with *exetastai* the investigatory function prevails, while the task of protecting the common interest predominates with the *prostatai*. I therefore continue to believe, albeit accepting Hamon's clarification, that the creation of the board of the *prostatai* in Iasos bears the mark of a political ideology that favoured the prerogatives of the *demoi*.¹⁰¹

There were also changes regarding the *prytaneis*. From the early third century BC, there are, when listed, never fewer than six *prytaneis*¹⁰² (with one partial exception), and sometimes seven or eight. The *ekkleusiastikon* decree seems to open this series. I believe that in the third century the number of *prytaneis* is linked to the number of assemblies scheduled in a semester just as it was in the fourth (NHI and the idea of continuity support this).¹⁰³ Boards with more than six members might be explained by taking into account the *archairesiai* and the intercalary month, although perhaps also by circumstances unknown to us.¹⁰⁴

Absenteeism went counter to the principles of participation and collegial responsibility, and the community took action against it. First of all, this decision testifies to a recognition of the importance of the *prytaneis* and their tasks. The main aim must have been to make the entire board responsible for their duties. *Prytaneis* (see § 1.3) had to present the agenda at the Assemblies, manage the debate and, before counting the votes, put law-enforcing motions to the vote. As the case of *proedroi* in Athens shows, the latter prerogative gave the presidents the power and responsibility of a discretionary right of veto. Consequently, they could be charged with having put a motion to the vote that was contrary to the law or not putting a lawful proposal to the vote.¹⁰⁵ In Iasos the entire board was now given this responsibility.¹⁰⁶ I would suggest that the requirement to act collegially was enforced by imposing fines, as Aristotle advises.¹⁰⁷

¹⁰¹ Fabiani 2015a: 290.

¹⁰² See table 35 in Fabiani 2015a: 249–51. The exception is *I.Iasos* 39, a decree promulgated in the same session as Maddoli 2007, no. 11.B: while the first documents a board of five *prytaneis*, the second lists seven.

¹⁰³ Fröhlich 2021: 295–304 raises objections (but refrains from offering an explanation for the varying number of Iasian *prytaneis*).

¹⁰⁴ A decree from the period in question testifies to an administrative subdivision of the year into semesters (Maddoli 2007, no. 11.B, 2: [χαιμερινῆς (?) ἐ]ξαμήνου ...). Assemblies are held monthly, and the decree for the *ekkleusiastikon* establishes that the procedure takes place 'on the sixth day of each month and at the elections'. In a semester with elections, which clearly entailed at least one additional meeting, the number of Assemblies rises from six to seven, and sometimes there are seven *prytaneis*. Boards with eight members are puzzling, although the intercalary month might have some relevance. My proposal in Fabiani 2015a: 297–9 is not entirely convincing; Fröhlich's objections (2021: 303) are correct in this instance.

¹⁰⁵ Canevaro 2018d: 126–31. For the right of veto of the *proedroi*: Aeschin. 2.84.

¹⁰⁶ For comparison with Athens, cf. Dem. 24.50.

¹⁰⁷ Arist. *Pol.* 4, 1297a36–41. Fabiani 2015a: 289–91.

We can therefore identify a crucial moment for civic reforms, which, in line with the *ethos* of the institutions of Iasos, move in different but complementary directions: these reforms guarantee broader democratic participation (*ekklesiastikon*) and involve middle-high stratum citizens in a more responsible way in the management of the public good (with full boards of *prytaneis*). Alongside this, the *polis* implemented fuller compliance with the law through the *prostatai* (guarantors of the correctness of behaviour and procedures in the interest of the whole community) and the *prytaneis* (guarantors of respect for the rules in the deliberative context). This effectively produced greater participation of the people, as attested by the larger number of inscriptions as well as by the increased amount of proposals from the *bouleutai*.

5. FROM THE MID-THIRD TO THE EARLY SECOND CENTURY BC: THE *PRYTANEIS*, RESPECT FOR THE *NOMOS* AND THE INCREASING ROLE OF THE ELITE

In the first half of the third century, approved decrees starting with *πρυτάνεων γνῶμαι* gradually became more numerous.¹⁰⁸ From c. 250 BC, *psephismata* are only the result of proposals made by the board of the *prytaneis*. This shift is significant, especially since it occurred alongside others.

1. From c. 250 BC absentee *prytaneis* had to appoint a substitute, while in the 80s–70s of the third century non-attendance did not yet require any replacement. At that time the boards of *prytaneis* were usually complete, but we still find a case of reduced numbers.¹⁰⁹ The substitution is recorded using two formulas. The more frequent and simpler one is Λέοντος [τοῦ] [—]ίππου, κατασταθέντος ὑπὸ Ἀριστοφάνου τοῦ Νουμηνίου (*I.Iasos* 82, 4–5), ‘Leon son of [–] hippos designated by Aristophanes son of Noumenius’. The verb *καθίστημι* indicates a direct designation without the intervention of civic bodies.

The second formula was identified by Fröhlich in a recent study on the replacement of magistrates in Hellenistic *poleis*. Fröhlich argues convincingly that in the formula Λεοντ[ί]σκου τοῦ [..]ο[...].ο[υ] κατασταθέντος ὑπὸ Ἀρχιδήμου τοῦ Σαραπ[ί]ωνος δι’ ἐπιτρόπου [α]ὑτοῦ Εὐκτιμένου τοῦ Ἰατροκλέους, the expression δι’ ἐπιτρόπου

¹⁰⁸ I consider here decree groups 7–8 (Fabiani 2015a: 263–70).

¹⁰⁹ See n. 105. Perhaps two *prytaneis* were absent at the *boule* meeting where the proposal was advanced.

(SEG 41.932, 27–30) does not indicate, as I suggested, a legal guardian who would have acted in the name of an underage *prytanis*,¹¹⁰ but a delegate who appoints a substitute for a *prytanis* who cannot be there in person. According to Fröhlich,¹¹¹ the more usual formula would occur when the absence was foreseeable and perhaps prolonged; an *epitropos* would have been involved in cases of unexpected absence.

Fröhlich believes that substitutes were chosen from among the members of the Council,¹¹² since, in his opinion, the Iasian *prytaneis* were more likely to have been *bouleutai* as they were in Athens. As mentioned earlier, I do not agree with this idea and I do not think that absentees would have had to find a replacement within the *boule*. Moreover, if the replacement had been restricted to a predetermined list, it would hardly have been necessary to resort to an *epitropos* when the office holder was unable to appoint someone. Above all, the substitution underlines the importance that the Iasians assigned to always having a complete board.¹¹³ In fact, wherever the substitution formula is present, there are never fewer than six *prytaneis*.

2. From the same period, the motion formula δεδῶχθαι τῆι βουλῆι καὶ τῶι δήμῳι appears regularly in decrees; this is a formula recited by officials who turn to the Council asking both Council and Assembly for approval:¹¹⁴ these are the *prytaneis*.

From the middle of the third century BC, therefore, it is only the *prytaneis* who submit motions to the Council and Assembly, and the increased importance of their role is highlighted by the requirement that they be substituted if absent. However, the new rule did not prevent a citizen or a *bouleutes* from suggesting a proposal.¹¹⁵ In fact, starting from the 30s of the third century BC, decrees contain the so-called ‘original motion’ (*prosodos/ephodos*). This is the formula *περὶ ὧν ἐπῆλθεν ὁ δεῖνα*, which identifies the private citizen or the *bouleutes* or the board of magistrates that asked the *prytaneis* to present a motion, as seen here: *πρυτάνεων [γνώμη· περὶ ὧν] ἐπῆλθεν Δημαγόρας Ἐξηκέ[στου, ἵνα Ἀντήνωρ Εὐανδρίδου Μιλήσιος ἐπ[αινεθῆι]...* (*I.Iasos* 36, 4–6).

¹¹⁰ Fabiani 2012: 143–7; 2015a: 213–14.

¹¹¹ Fröhlich 2021: 307–20. Dimopoulou 2021: 330–2 provides a contrasting hypothesis.

¹¹² Gschnitzer 1973: 795 and Dimopoulou 2021: 331 are of the same opinion.

¹¹³ I therefore cannot agree with Dimopoulou’s proposal (2021: 331) that replacement of the *prytaneis* ‘was allowed, but it was not compulsory’.

¹¹⁴ Fabiani 2015a: 297: the motion formula was inserted in the text of the decrees only shortly before 250 BC, initially in the form *δεδῶχθαι τῶι δήμῳι*, which corresponds to a formulation presented in the Assembly.

¹¹⁵ Fabiani 2015a: 299–300.

Therefore, the new rule did not deprive other political subjects of the right to propose a motion. On the contrary, Gauthier and Hamon are undoubtedly correct in seeing the presence of the original motion as a sign of democratic vitality and political participation.¹¹⁶ What we find only reveals that from c. 250 BC a citizen, a *bouleutes* or even a board of magistrates (certainly for the *prostatai* and *strategoï*)¹¹⁷ who wanted to make a proposal to the Council first had to present it to the *prytaneis*. If accepted, they could present it as their own to the *boule* and *demos*. The city was well organised democratically but gave itself a new regulation.

It is certainly true, as Hamon maintains,¹¹⁸ that the clause *περὶ ὧν ἐπῆλθεν ὁ δεῖνα* – while new in form (in Iasos) – must have actually corresponded to a pre-existing practice. Even before 250 BC, a citizen from outside the Council who wanted to bring a proposal to the Assembly would have had to present his motion to the *prytaneis*. What makes the appearance of the original motion truly significant is the simultaneous disappearance of the formula *ὁ δεῖνα εἶπε*. From then on, even a *bouleutes* had to submit his proposal to the *prytaneis* to have it heard by the Council.

It is the very disappearance of direct proposals by the *bouleutai* that causes me to disagree with Fröhlich, who sees these new features of the Iasian decrees as mere drafting changes that reveal no shift in the role of the *prytaneis*, in institutional regulations or deliberative practice.¹¹⁹ I would like to draw attention to three pairs of decrees from the first half of the third century. Each pair was deliberated in the same Assembly meeting and drafted by the same *grammateus*, and yet in each pair the proposal takes different forms. *I.Iasos* 42 and 60 were presented by an individual proponent and by the board of the *prytaneis* respectively; the same goes for *I.Iasos* 56 and Maddoli 2007, no. 21, while *I.Iasos* 64 and 59 are the outcome of an individual proposal and of an *ἀρχόντων γνώμη* respectively. Variability in formulas is therefore not explained by the individual preferences of the *grammateus*, but on substantial facts, that is, on the fact that at that moment *bouleutai*, *archontes* or *prytaneis* could all directly present proposals to the *boule*. The disappearance of such diversity after c. 250 BC cannot be explained by drafting changes alone.¹²⁰

¹¹⁶ Gauthier 1993: 220–1; 2005; Hamon 2009: 360–2.

¹¹⁷ *Prostatai* presenting an *epodos*: *I.Iasos* 73, 28–9, 56–7; *prostatai* and *strategoï*: *I.Iasos* 74, 26–7, 52–3; *I.Iasos* 51, 2–3.

¹¹⁸ Hamon 2009: 360–2. On the formula in Iasos, with an interpretation similar to mine, see Carlsson 2010: 174–5.

¹¹⁹ Thus Fröhlich 2013: 563, Hamon 2016 and most recently Fröhlich 2021: 306: ‘les réformes institutionnelles que R. Fabiani croit tirer de l’étude du formulaire relèvent plutôt d’évolutions dans les formules de rédaction, pour des décrets (pour des juges étrangers) très stéréotypés’.

¹²⁰ This is why I believe that the growth of the role of the *prytaneis* is not just ‘une illusion d’optique’ (Hamon 2016: 412).

The formulae clearly show that around 250 the Iasians introduced a new rule in the deliberative process: from then on, only γνῶμαι of the *prytaneis* could be discussed in the Council and Assembly.

The premises for this decision had been laid down earlier, at the beginning of the third century. In deference to one of key features of the *ethos* of its *politeia*, the *polis* had enhanced the role of the upper middle class with a view to a balanced sharing of responsibilities for the common good and had charged the *prytaneis* with more stringent collegial responsibilities. The entire board was entrusted with the complex task of chairing the Council and the Assembly sessions as well as overseeing the legitimacy of the motions put to the vote. Now the same goals, and particularly those encouraging respect for the *nomoi*, were pursued in a stronger and more structured way. The *prytaneis* were entrusted with the preliminary assessment of the legality of the motions that had to be voted on by the two principal *fora* of the city. Any proposal, unless raised by the board of *prytaneis* itself, had to undergo three levels of verification and discussion: by the *prytaneis*, by the Council, and by the Assembly. Through this preliminary evaluation, the *prytaneis* took charge of all the motions they deemed correct, and everything became a *πρωτάνεων γνώμη*. Despite the doubts raised by Hamon,¹²¹ it seems clear to me that the *prytaneis* were increasingly called upon to take on a role as filters in the deliberative process, becoming a sort of *probouloi*.

This was, I believe, a simple modification of the regulations (as had occurred in the previous period when citizenship was only granted in the month of Aphrodision).¹²² It aimed at ensuring greater legal rigour to the proposals to be discussed in the Council and Assembly: this modification was part of that process of progressively defining roles and competences that Müller recognises in the Hellenistic *poleis*.¹²³ In fact, this procedural change further defined the divided power and the multi-institutional interaction that characterised deliberation in the Greek *poleis*.¹²⁴ The need for rigour, itself dictated by a sense of respect for the *nomos*, was probably also highlighted by financial difficulties. Careful evaluations made by elected, and competent, magistrates may have seemed necessary.¹²⁵ Henceforth, the insertion of financial formulas that

¹²¹ Hamon 2016: 412 on Fabiani 2015a: 297.

¹²² On this, see Fabiani 2015a: 291–4. Pace Errington 2016, I do not consider the introduction of the rule on granting citizenship in Aphrodision to be an example of limiting the democratic prerogatives of the *demos*.

¹²³ Müller 1995: 51.

¹²⁴ Esu 2024.

¹²⁵ We have indirect evidence of such difficulties in these very years. The god Apollo was increasingly designated *stephanephoros* due to the lack of citizens willing to take on this expensive task. Costs were paid with money from the treasury of his sanctuary: Fabiani 2015a: 299–301.

explain how to find resources to pay for the costs associated with the decrees can also be linked to this greater rigour.¹²⁶

Although I believe that the change was essentially procedural, as NHI suggests, institutions exert constraints over collective and individual behaviour and actively affect circumstances and politics.¹²⁷ Starting from the 30s of the third century, a couple of decades after it was established that the *prytaneis* were the magistrates to whom motions had to be submitted, prosopographical analysis reveals that the members of the board increasingly came from the city's elite.¹²⁸ The new prerogatives of the *prytaneis* made this role more attractive to the most distinguished families. Moreover, from the same period on, we have only magistrates or exponents of the city elite submitting motions to the *prytaneis*, in contrast to the first half of the third century, when there were also individual proponents who were not members of eminent families.

On the other hand, both the social level of those honoured and the importance of the honours conferred rose correspondingly, and often this also affected foreign communities. The increasingly frequent decrees for foreign judges and their hometowns are a good case in point.¹²⁹ Moreover, the number of published decrees fell, given that inscriptions on stone were now mostly reserved for decrees of high social and symbolic merit. This selection, which favoured the more official proposals, perhaps obscures those decisions of a more modest calibre raised by proponents who were less socially and politically eminent.

The frequent resort to foreign judges also affected the participation of citizens in public life. The institution of the *metapemptoi dikastai*, encouraged initially by the Hellenistic rulers, became almost habitual over time as it seemed to guarantee greater civic concord.¹³⁰ At the same time, however, it deprived ordinary citizens of the judicial function (Arist. *Pol.* 3, 1275a22–23, 1281b31), undermining the sense of dignity and equality that such a function conveyed. It also projected the elites into a dimension of relationships and honours above the *polis* which, while not lessening their dedication to civic good, surely nourished a sense of superiority.

It should be reaffirmed, however, that the social and cultural phenomena in question were limited and had only gradual effect. The *polis* of Iasos retained the key institutions to which its democratic *ethos* was anchored: the decisive role of the Assembly and the Council – and participation in them – did not fail. Indeed, it is precisely in this period that the high numbers of votes cast in the *boule* and in the *demos* (see § 1.3) are recorded.

¹²⁶ On financial formulas, see Fabiani 2015a: 116–18, 300–1.

¹²⁷ March and Olsen 1984: 738–40.

¹²⁸ Fabiani 2012: 138–49.

¹²⁹ The decrees (group 8) under discussion are, in fact, extremely numerous, but cover an extensive period: Fabiani 2015a: 264–9.

¹³⁰ Magnosto 2015. See also Simonton in this volume.

The city thus remained attached to its tradition of moderate democracy. Nevertheless, partly also in line with criteria of increased efficiency, it strengthened one of the bases on which the balance of its fundamental *ethos* rested. It achieved this by encouraging the involvement of the highest social strata in the management of the common good through the authoritative role now conferred on the *prytaneis*. Due to the complexity of the institutions (which combine legal aspects and social practices) and the influence they exert on society, a slow shift in the balance of the *polis* was initiated. The *gnorimoi* gradually had more say in the deliberative institutions and more chance to guide the choices made by the city. Moreover, and perhaps above all, the growth of the role of the *prytaneis* – alongside the impact of foreign judges on popular participation – increased the social distance between the elite and ordinary citizens. In short, a new, albeit initially slight, shift took place, as in the Hecatomnid era, away from the spirit of the Iasian *politeia*.

The fundamental works of Gauthier and his school have long identified a turning point in the late Hellenistic period. Encouraged by the Roman conquest, this led to a small group of notables within the *poleis* taking power into their own hands.¹³¹ This moment was certainly decisive and, as Hamon has clearly shown, is manifest in the changes undergone by the *boule*.¹³² In a city like Iasos, however, some premises for this elite leadership were endogenous and began to be seen, albeit fully within the democratic order, from the late third century. Through a slowly evolving process,¹³³ the civic elite, without altering the institutions, returned to assume a more distinct leadership role in the community just as they had done in the past. And Rome found a well-prepared terrain.

¹³¹ Gauthier 1985; Fröhlich and Müller 2005; Fröhlich 2004: esp. 82–3, 91–2; Hamon 2007: 81–2, 87–90; 2009: 374–5. On the Roman conquest as a decisive factor in the imposition of stable oligarchies in the Greek *poleis*, see also Börm 2019: esp. 295–306.

¹³² Hamon 2005.

¹³³ Fioretos, Falleti and Sheingate 2016b: 14: ‘slow-moving processes of gradual change rather than singular historical break points may be the source of radical change’.