The relation between affective and logical factors of human subjectivity has often been polarized into an old fashioned, but still popular, dualisms. On the one hand, Cartesian tradition grounds selfhood on res cogitans, as an ontological entity; on the other hand, Humean skepticism defines the Ego as a mere bundle of perceptions. Pragmatism provides a meaningful way out to this dilemma, by claiming that the Self is situated in the middle area between individual and social dimensions. Leaning on influent authors like Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty, and looking at contemporary psychology, sociology and political thought, the author of the essay suggests a dialogical definition of selfhood. Dialogue and solidarity must be intended here as basic features of our social and private experience, rather than as simple good intentions. Through a discussion of Davidson’s principle of charity and Rorty’s ironic solidarity, she argues that there are good historical, theoretical and political reasons to uphold a contingent definition of the Self, according to which we are all embedded in our own final vocabulary, but at the same time we are able to call it into question.
Il problema del rapporto tra fattori logico-razionali e fattori sensoriali-affettivi nella soggettività umana è troppo spesso polarizzato in un vecchio, ma sempre popolare dualismo. Da un lato, abbiamo la tradizione cartesiana della res cogitans come entità spirituale a fondamento del Sé e della sua verità; dall’altro, troviamo lo scetticismo humeano, che intende l’Io come semplice fascio di percezioni. La visuale pragmatista propone una via d’uscita sensata a questo dilemma, proponendo l’immagine di un soggetto plastico, collocato nell’interferenza tra dimensione collettiva e dimensione individuale. Appoggiandosi ad autori come Rorty e Davidson, con uno sguardo alla psicologia, alla sociologia ed alla riflessione politica contemporanea, il saggio suggerisce una definizione del Sé dialogica e solidale, in cui il dialogo e solidarietà vengono intese aldilà di ogni morale dei buoni propositi come dimensioni fondanti l’esperienza sociale e privata del soggetto umano. A partire dal davidsoniano principle of charity e dall’ironia solidale di matrice rortiana, l’autrice difende le buone ragioni storiche, politiche e teoretiche di un Sé intessuto dalla contingenza del proprio final vocabulary.
Calcaterra, R.M. (2005). Individuale, sociale, solidale. Dissonanze e armonie. In Calcaterra R (a cura di), Semiotica e fenomenologia del sé (pp. 25-44). Torino : Nino Aragno.
Individuale, sociale, solidale. Dissonanze e armonie
CALCATERRA, Rosa Maria
2005-01-01
Abstract
The relation between affective and logical factors of human subjectivity has often been polarized into an old fashioned, but still popular, dualisms. On the one hand, Cartesian tradition grounds selfhood on res cogitans, as an ontological entity; on the other hand, Humean skepticism defines the Ego as a mere bundle of perceptions. Pragmatism provides a meaningful way out to this dilemma, by claiming that the Self is situated in the middle area between individual and social dimensions. Leaning on influent authors like Donald Davidson and Richard Rorty, and looking at contemporary psychology, sociology and political thought, the author of the essay suggests a dialogical definition of selfhood. Dialogue and solidarity must be intended here as basic features of our social and private experience, rather than as simple good intentions. Through a discussion of Davidson’s principle of charity and Rorty’s ironic solidarity, she argues that there are good historical, theoretical and political reasons to uphold a contingent definition of the Self, according to which we are all embedded in our own final vocabulary, but at the same time we are able to call it into question.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.