A theorethical model empirically testable is provided to analyze the effects on productive efficiency of corporatist institutional setting. It is found a robust evidence of a U-shaped relationship with TFP and it is confirmed that coordination and coverage are institutional means to internalize the negative spillovers of highly pervasive unions. The progress this paper marks over previous studies is due to the choice of a) a wide array of indicators of institutional settings rather than a single index of centralizazion, and b) a dependent variable (TFP) closer to the logic ot the theorethical approach with respect to the effects of institutions and rules (collective bargaining, financial constaints, etc) on the dynamics of productive efficency
Felli, E. (2007). Productive Efficiency and Corporatist Institutions. In The Political Economy of the European Constitution (pp. 49-89). BURLINGTON : Ashgate Publishing Company.
Productive Efficiency and Corporatist Institutions
FELLI, Ernesto
2007-01-01
Abstract
A theorethical model empirically testable is provided to analyze the effects on productive efficiency of corporatist institutional setting. It is found a robust evidence of a U-shaped relationship with TFP and it is confirmed that coordination and coverage are institutional means to internalize the negative spillovers of highly pervasive unions. The progress this paper marks over previous studies is due to the choice of a) a wide array of indicators of institutional settings rather than a single index of centralizazion, and b) a dependent variable (TFP) closer to the logic ot the theorethical approach with respect to the effects of institutions and rules (collective bargaining, financial constaints, etc) on the dynamics of productive efficencyI documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
