Truth in progress: the value of the facts-and-feelings connection in William James

As it is well-known, Peirce coined the term “pragmaticism” to differentiate his own philosophy from James’ pragmatism. John Dewey’s assertion that in James’ works “the man always takes precedence over the philosopher” might be appropriate for beginning to describe this difference. Indeed, James’ emphasis on individual experiences and on feelings as determining factors of every human performance, including the logical-rational activity, and his acute awareness of philosophical systems” shortcomings form a style of thinking that is quite alien to Peirce. An integral part of the following comments will be to show that James’ anti-intellectualism cannot be identified with an irrationalist agenda. To be sure, such an interpretation is possible only if we focus on a few particular expressions, without considering the whole of his philosophical discourse. In other words, we should keep in mind that his anti-intellectualism does not mean a revolt against the markedly human activities, skills, and perspectives to which the term “rationality” traditionally refers. Rather, James’ objective, like that of Peirce and the other pragmatists, is to demonstrate the inadequacy of those traditional images of rationality, which are based on the abstract criteria of rationalism or on a conception of human intelligence that fails to appreciate its concrete complexity. To show that irrationalism is extraneous to James’ thought, I will first take into account both its principal similarities and specific differences with Peirce’s pragmatism.