The research objectives of the paper are twofold: 1) to map patterns of financial architecture a la Myers (1999) of the Italian manufacturing medium-sized companies (hereafter MSEs), in order to identify and classify their more frequently observed behaviors in terms of ownership, governance, and financial structure 2) to verify whether, and under which conditions, the financial architectures has a significant impact on the firm's risk taking behavior. The hypothesis is that the Italian MSEs' risk taking attitude is influenced by ownership (equity invested in the firm, number of owners, ownership concentration, subjective and behavioural characteristics of the owners like age, social and cultural background, value system, entrepreneurial culture, risk attitude, etc.) and governance (number and composition of boards, owners' involvement in management, founder/CEO duality, degree of formalization of the decision-making process, role/contribution of the younger generation, etc.). The traditional approach, internationally, analyzes ownership and governance using a "stand alone" approach, referring to general and abstract models of financial architecture (for example, family versus non-family business). On the contrary, this paper tries to empirically identify and specify which aspects of the financial architecture (and which qualifications of these aspects) have a more relevant impact, trying to quantify their impact, both as "stand alone" determinants, and as more frequently observable combinations. The risk-taking profile is analyzed with reference to the innovation strategy. In fact, this strategy represents an extended risk taking behavior: it is characterized by high investments and sunk costs in the creation of new skills/advantages, and extended lags between investment and results. Furthermore, it can drastically change the competitive position, the organizational arrangements, and the internal and external relationships. The analysis is conducted on the Mediobanca-Unioncamere universe of the Italian manufacturing MSEs in the mechanical and textile-clothing-leather industries, during the 2000-2002 period (i.e. 1459 firms).
Aguiari, R., Venanzi, D. (2007). Architettura finanziaria, rischio e effetto distretto nelle medie imprese industriali italiane. In ROBERTO CAFFERATA (a cura di), Finanza e industria in Italia-Ripensare la corporate governance e i rapporti tra banche, imprese e risparmiatori per lo sviluppo della competitività (pp. 343-360). BOLOGNA : Il Mulino.
Architettura finanziaria, rischio e effetto distretto nelle medie imprese industriali italiane
VENANZI, Daniela
2007-01-01
Abstract
The research objectives of the paper are twofold: 1) to map patterns of financial architecture a la Myers (1999) of the Italian manufacturing medium-sized companies (hereafter MSEs), in order to identify and classify their more frequently observed behaviors in terms of ownership, governance, and financial structure 2) to verify whether, and under which conditions, the financial architectures has a significant impact on the firm's risk taking behavior. The hypothesis is that the Italian MSEs' risk taking attitude is influenced by ownership (equity invested in the firm, number of owners, ownership concentration, subjective and behavioural characteristics of the owners like age, social and cultural background, value system, entrepreneurial culture, risk attitude, etc.) and governance (number and composition of boards, owners' involvement in management, founder/CEO duality, degree of formalization of the decision-making process, role/contribution of the younger generation, etc.). The traditional approach, internationally, analyzes ownership and governance using a "stand alone" approach, referring to general and abstract models of financial architecture (for example, family versus non-family business). On the contrary, this paper tries to empirically identify and specify which aspects of the financial architecture (and which qualifications of these aspects) have a more relevant impact, trying to quantify their impact, both as "stand alone" determinants, and as more frequently observable combinations. The risk-taking profile is analyzed with reference to the innovation strategy. In fact, this strategy represents an extended risk taking behavior: it is characterized by high investments and sunk costs in the creation of new skills/advantages, and extended lags between investment and results. Furthermore, it can drastically change the competitive position, the organizational arrangements, and the internal and external relationships. The analysis is conducted on the Mediobanca-Unioncamere universe of the Italian manufacturing MSEs in the mechanical and textile-clothing-leather industries, during the 2000-2002 period (i.e. 1459 firms).I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
