This study provides an interpretative scheme and an empirically testable model of the so-called demand for justice in Italy. Using a microeconomic model of the litigants' choice, the features of the judicial, legal and economic systems have been modeled as they influence two parties' decisions and may cause opportunistic behavior. The empirical analysys shoes that lengtht time-spans and raised costs of associated processes and high market rates have a disincentive effect on recouse to justice, prevailing on that connected to opportunistic behavior of the plaintiff. We do noto find evidence for the "pahological demand" hypothesis.
Felli, E., Felli, E., David Londono, B., Nazaria, S., Giovanni, T. (2008). The Demand for Jiustice in Italy: Civil Litigation and the Judicial System. In Fabio Padovono and Roberto Ricciuti (a cura di), Italian Institutional Reforms: A Public Choice Perspective (pp. 155-177). NEW YORK : Springer.
The Demand for Jiustice in Italy: Civil Litigation and the Judicial System
FELLI, Ernesto;
2008-01-01
Abstract
This study provides an interpretative scheme and an empirically testable model of the so-called demand for justice in Italy. Using a microeconomic model of the litigants' choice, the features of the judicial, legal and economic systems have been modeled as they influence two parties' decisions and may cause opportunistic behavior. The empirical analysys shoes that lengtht time-spans and raised costs of associated processes and high market rates have a disincentive effect on recouse to justice, prevailing on that connected to opportunistic behavior of the plaintiff. We do noto find evidence for the "pahological demand" hypothesis.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
