This article focuses on Plotinus’ reading of Plato’s Timaeus. This dialogue plays a prominent role in Plotinus’ philosophy but Plotinus’ use of it is selective to say the least. For example, Plotinus often refers to Plato’s account of the world soul (see Tim. 35 a ff.), but removes Plato’s distinctive mathematical background. Plotinus, therefore, takes Plato’s words to express the idea that the soul has a middle ontological position between intelligible (indivisible and unextended) and sensible (divisible and extended) beings. Plato’s emphasis on the mathematical composition of the soul is simply left out. The same holds for Plato’s reading of Tim. 36 d-e (body-soul relation). Furthermore, Plotinus does not incorporate Plato’s account of the atomic triangles. To sum up: Plotinus removes Plato’s emphasis on the metaphysical and cognitive role of mathematics. The positive counterpart to this attitude lies in Plotinus’ pervasive reference to Peripatetic hylomorphism. Plotinus does not endorse this philosophical view, but develops his reading of Plato through a consistent critical discussion of Aristotle’s and Alexander of Aphrodisias’ hylomorphism. Plotinus’ accounts of providence and sensible particulars provide interesting examples of this situation.
Chiaradonna, R. (2014). Plotinus' Metaphorical Reading of the Timaeus: Soul, Mathematics, Providence. In P. d'Hoine and G. Van Riel (a cura di), Fate, Providence and Moral Responsibility in Ancient, Medieval and Early Modern ThoughtStudies in Honour of Carlos Steel (pp. 188-210). LEUVEN : Leuven University Press.
Plotinus' Metaphorical Reading of the Timaeus: Soul, Mathematics, Providence
CHIARADONNA, RICCARDO
2014-01-01
Abstract
This article focuses on Plotinus’ reading of Plato’s Timaeus. This dialogue plays a prominent role in Plotinus’ philosophy but Plotinus’ use of it is selective to say the least. For example, Plotinus often refers to Plato’s account of the world soul (see Tim. 35 a ff.), but removes Plato’s distinctive mathematical background. Plotinus, therefore, takes Plato’s words to express the idea that the soul has a middle ontological position between intelligible (indivisible and unextended) and sensible (divisible and extended) beings. Plato’s emphasis on the mathematical composition of the soul is simply left out. The same holds for Plato’s reading of Tim. 36 d-e (body-soul relation). Furthermore, Plotinus does not incorporate Plato’s account of the atomic triangles. To sum up: Plotinus removes Plato’s emphasis on the metaphysical and cognitive role of mathematics. The positive counterpart to this attitude lies in Plotinus’ pervasive reference to Peripatetic hylomorphism. Plotinus does not endorse this philosophical view, but develops his reading of Plato through a consistent critical discussion of Aristotle’s and Alexander of Aphrodisias’ hylomorphism. Plotinus’ accounts of providence and sensible particulars provide interesting examples of this situation.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.