This paper introduces an employment target for trade unions in a model of strategic wage bargaining à la Lippi (2003). It shows that the first best equilibrium can be replicated if and only if the employment target is higher than the competitive level.
Cavallari, L. (2013). Wage bargaining under an employment target.
Wage bargaining under an employment target
CAVALLARI, Lilia
2013-01-01
Abstract
This paper introduces an employment target for trade unions in a model of strategic wage bargaining à la Lippi (2003). It shows that the first best equilibrium can be replicated if and only if the employment target is higher than the competitive level.File in questo prodotto:
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