The chapter focuses on the crisis experienced within NATO since the end of the 1970s because of the different security priorities concerning the implementation of the dual-track decision emerging on the two sides of the Atlantic. The Alliance cohesion was eventually restored through a rather flexible pursuing of the so-called zero option that allowed the European deploying countries to demonstrate their commitment to arms control to their domestic public opinions, while the United States could remain committed to the implementation of the preferred modernization course.
|Titolo:||The Euromissile crisis and the centrality of the "zero option"|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2015|
|Citazione:||Gala, M. (2015). The Euromissile crisis and the centrality of the "zero option". In F.B. Leopoldo Nuti (a cura di), The Euromissile crisis and the end of the cold war (pp. 158-175). Washington : Woodrow Wilson Center Press.|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||2.1 Contributo in volume (Capitolo o Saggio)|