Arrow's information paradox features the most radical kind of information asymmetry by diagnosing an inherent conflict between two parties inclined to exchange information. In this paper, we argue that this paradox is more richly textured than generally supposed by current economic discussion on it and that its meaning encroaches on philosophy. In particular, we uncovers the `epistemic' and more genuine version of the paradox, which looms on our cognitive lives like a sort of tax on curiosity. Finally, we sketch the relation between Arrow's information paradox and the notion of zero-knowledge proofs in cryptography: roughly speaking, zero-knowledge proofs are protocols that enable a prover to convince a verifier that a statement is true, without conveying any additional information.

Piazza, M., Pedicini, M. (2019). What Arrow’s Information Paradox Says (to Philosophers). In Don Berkich and Matteo Vincenzo d'Alfonso (a cura di), On the Cognitive, Ethical, and Scientific Dimensions of Artificial Intelligence: Themes from IACAP 2016 (pp. 83-94). Cham : Springer International Publishing [10.1007/978-3-030-01800-9_5].

What Arrow’s Information Paradox Says (to Philosophers)

Pedicini, Marco
2019-01-01

Abstract

Arrow's information paradox features the most radical kind of information asymmetry by diagnosing an inherent conflict between two parties inclined to exchange information. In this paper, we argue that this paradox is more richly textured than generally supposed by current economic discussion on it and that its meaning encroaches on philosophy. In particular, we uncovers the `epistemic' and more genuine version of the paradox, which looms on our cognitive lives like a sort of tax on curiosity. Finally, we sketch the relation between Arrow's information paradox and the notion of zero-knowledge proofs in cryptography: roughly speaking, zero-knowledge proofs are protocols that enable a prover to convince a verifier that a statement is true, without conveying any additional information.
2019
978-3-030-01800-9
Piazza, M., Pedicini, M. (2019). What Arrow’s Information Paradox Says (to Philosophers). In Don Berkich and Matteo Vincenzo d'Alfonso (a cura di), On the Cognitive, Ethical, and Scientific Dimensions of Artificial Intelligence: Themes from IACAP 2016 (pp. 83-94). Cham : Springer International Publishing [10.1007/978-3-030-01800-9_5].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11590/345504
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