Ethics and the Hierarchy of Virtues from Plotinus to Iamblichus

This article aims to show the connection between the ethical views of early Neoplatonist philosophers (Plotinus, Porphyry, and Iamblichus) and their metaphysical doctrines concerning the hierarchy of being. In §1 it is argued that Plotinus focuses on virtues within the framework of a discussion about how the embodied soul can revert to the intelligible god (Plotinus, 1.2). According to Plotinus the intelligible god has no virtues: there are paradigms of virtues in the Intellect, but these are not the virtues themselves. This is consistent with Plotinus’ view that different levels in the hierarchy of being are heterogeneous and do not share the same properties. Plotinus’ approach makes the status of political virtues problematic. §2 and §3 focus on Porphyry and Iamblichus. Their arrangements of the levels of virtue are connected with their accounts of the hierarchy of being, which differ both from Plotinus’ and from each other. Porphyry’s account in Sent. 32 is based on the idea that the cause pre-contains what depends on it (hence Porphyry’s emphasis on paradigmatic virtues). Iamblichus’ account seems to rely on his view that different levels in the hierarchy are connected through analogy.