Plotinus on Hylomorphic Forms

This chapter focuses on Plotinus’ engagement with Aristotle’s hylomorphism against the wider background of Plotinus’ account of living beings. Plotinus’ general point throughout his writings is that, whatever one might think of the soul as an enmattered form, its status is not sufficiently distinct from that of the body and of its attributes. So Aristotle cannot ground his own distinction between body and soul, since the soul is an attribute among others and all attempts to make sense of its status and of its causal role are doomed to fail. This chapter outlines Plotinus’ critical approach to Aristotle’s hylomorphism from the early treatise 4.7 through the treatises on the soul (4.3 and 4.4) down to the treatises 6.7 and 6.3, where Plotinus develops his own sophisticated theory of incorporeal forms. Particular attention is paid to the status of living bodies within Plotinus’ account of causation.