CONSUETUDINE/COGNITUDINE. Appropriatezza, valore, significato

In this essay, I propose an interpretation of the idea of custom/consuetude as cognitude (a neologism that already exists in English). My argument stems from the etymological roots of the word consuetude and the dis-composition of its components. In Latin, the word ‘consuetudo’ is structured as: ‘cum-‘ and ‘suetudo’; where ‘suetudo’ harks back to ‘suum’, which in turn conjures up the ideas of ‘adaptation’ and ‘appropriateness’. What emerges from the analysis of these semantic roots is a relational and reflexive understanding of the historical signification of ‘consuetude.’ In Ancient Roman Law it was defined as a normative source fed by so called opinio iuris seu necessitatis, intended also as the pre-requisite of its binding value. Both ‘adaptation’ and ‘appropriateness’ are related to a subject, and as such involve a cognitive action, which is the origin of their meaning. From this perspective, the idea of consuetude and its normativity seems to be imtermingled with cognition, so that its significance and binding efficaciousness cannot be detached from its suit-ability (not by accident echoing con-suetudo) for the subject caught in its relationship with their social and natural environment. ‘Consuetude’ and ‘cognitude’ end up proving to be two processive experiences unfolding in parallel, even if only asymptotically. Adopting this correspondence as a theoretical sextant and using a methodological enactive approach, I analyze various aspects of custom–specifically in the civil law tradition–by starting anew five times, in five sections. The overall intent is to engage a reflexively interactional and multi-perspectival reading of custom that illuminates the deep connection between cognition and evaluation at the source of legal experience, as well as the legitimacy of both the customary and statute law.