This chapter explores the origins of meaning through a Darwinian evolutionary lens, focusing on the continuities between animal communication and human language. Early research in animal communication adopted a semantic-informative approach to meaning, aiming to identify referential capacities in non-human primate calls—specifically, the ability to refer to external objects or events. This referential model has been challenged by pragmatic accounts, which propose that referential acts involve both a referential (informative) intention and a social (communicative) intention, rather than merely linking signals to referents. Indeed, while referential intention remains central to understanding meaning, not all communicative acts—animal or human—are purely informational. Meaning, as a concept, extends beyond referentiality and encompasses persuasive functions as well. Animal communication and human language thus share not only informational but also rhetorical–persuasive features. A comprehensive investigation into the origins of meaning must therefore address both referential and persuasive dimensions of communication.
Adornetti, I., Ferretti, F. (2025). Origins of Meaning [10.1016/B978-0-323-95504-1.01177-7].
Origins of Meaning
Ines Adornetti
;Francesco Ferretti
2025-01-01
Abstract
This chapter explores the origins of meaning through a Darwinian evolutionary lens, focusing on the continuities between animal communication and human language. Early research in animal communication adopted a semantic-informative approach to meaning, aiming to identify referential capacities in non-human primate calls—specifically, the ability to refer to external objects or events. This referential model has been challenged by pragmatic accounts, which propose that referential acts involve both a referential (informative) intention and a social (communicative) intention, rather than merely linking signals to referents. Indeed, while referential intention remains central to understanding meaning, not all communicative acts—animal or human—are purely informational. Meaning, as a concept, extends beyond referentiality and encompasses persuasive functions as well. Animal communication and human language thus share not only informational but also rhetorical–persuasive features. A comprehensive investigation into the origins of meaning must therefore address both referential and persuasive dimensions of communication.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


