Plotinus on the Homonymy of Life

This article examines Plotinus’ conception of life (zōē) as a fundamentally homonymous item that structures his metaphysics. The analysis shows how life constitutes a distinct mode of being proper to incorporeal substances (Intellect and soul), in contrast to its merely derivative occurrence in bodies. Building on Kalligas’ application of Owen’s A/B predicate distinction, the study shows how life functions as an A-predicate—a categorial property of intelligible reality as such—rather than as a B-predicate tied to the content of specific Forms. While eternal life (Intellect) and temporal life (soul) exist in a hierarchical relationship, Plotinus rigorously maintains their homonymous character, rejecting any notion of generic unity. This insistence preserves the fundamental discontinuity between ontological levels and distinguishes Plotinus’ position from later Neoplatonists who sought to mediate between synonymy and homonymy. The article also explores how bodily life is merely an imitation of authentic life, highlighting Plotinus’ doctrine of vertical causation and his critical engagement with Aristotle’s theory of synonymy and predication. Close readings of key passages from Enneads III.7 and VI.7 elucidate these conceptual distinctions.