Governing global liquidity : the rise and fall of multilateral monetary reform, 1967–1997

This dissertation explores the rise and decline of multilateral monetary reform between 1967 and 1997, asking why ambitious efforts to reshape the international monetary system proved so difficult to sustain. It suggests that these challenges were not only the result of technical constraints or power imbalances, but were also linked to a more fundamental uncertainty about the role and purpose of international money. Focusing on the history of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), the study traces how competing visions of global liquidity—ranging from redistribution and development to neutrality and discipline—gradually narrowed over time. While the late 1960s and 1970s opened space for more expansive reform debates, later decades were marked by a shift toward concerns with credibility, market confidence, and institutional restraint. Drawing on archival material from the IMF, UNCTAD, and the U.S. Congress, the dissertation highlights how economic ideas, political dynamics, and institutional practices interacted in shaping the scope of monetary reform. It ultimately points to the enduring ambiguity surrounding the function of international money as a key factor in the ongoing difficulty of building a more balanced and stable global financial system.