Interdependence, Integration and Sharing. Armed Forces, Nuclear Weapons and Defence Policy in Cold War Italy, 1970-1987

This dissertation addresses a long-standing gap in the historiography of Italian foreign policy: the relative neglect of defence and military affairs. It examines the evolution of Italy’s defence policy during the Cold War, focusing on two interlinked processes: the restructuring of the Armed Forces in the 1970s and the development of a new Defence Model in the early 1980s, situating both within Italy’s simultaneous pursuit of a renewed "Mediterranean role". Drawing on multi-archival research across Italian, British, US, and NATO repositories, including governmental, military, intelligence, and private collections, the study traces Italy’s transition from an unattainable “strategic independence” to a deliberate Euro-Atlantic “strategic interdependence”, underpinned by the mechanisms of multilateral integration and bilateral sharing. The dissertation’s central argument is that this interdependence functioned not merely as a constraint, but also as a source of credibility and leverage. At the same time, it identifies persistent structural obstacles — chronic underfunding, inter-service rivalry, and discontinuous political commitment — that left the reform process incomplete by the end of the Cold War. Ultimately, the dissertation reframes Italy as a middle power whose defence policy evolved through a constant tension between alliance solidarity, national ambition, and structural constraints, offering a revised interpretation of the country’s Cold War strategic identity.