High drug prices are a permanent issue in global policy debate. Antitrust enforcement has traditionally targeted conduct that delays generic entry. Recent EU investigations, however, have focused on excessive pricing, and they have drawn attention in the U.S. as well. This paper first compares how market access, pricing and reimbursement rules shape prices, considering that the U.S. system is characterized by the near absence of price regulation and restrictions on pharmaceutical launch prices, while EU Member States typically apply price controls through various reimbursement schemes. It then examines how EU competition authorities have dealt with extraordinary price hikes, especially on old off-patent drugs and after acquisitions. Next, it examines the U.S. context, where, in the absence of a federal approach, States have considered non-antitrust measures such as rate setting and anti-price-gouging laws. Finally, the paper assesses the most consistent approach to extraordinary price increases in pharmaceutical markets and the role antitrust agencies should play.
Colangelo, M. (2021). Addressing high prescription drug price increases in EU and U.S. pharmaceutical markets: which role for antitrust policy?.
Addressing high prescription drug price increases in EU and U.S. pharmaceutical markets: which role for antitrust policy?
colangelo margherita
2021-01-01
Abstract
High drug prices are a permanent issue in global policy debate. Antitrust enforcement has traditionally targeted conduct that delays generic entry. Recent EU investigations, however, have focused on excessive pricing, and they have drawn attention in the U.S. as well. This paper first compares how market access, pricing and reimbursement rules shape prices, considering that the U.S. system is characterized by the near absence of price regulation and restrictions on pharmaceutical launch prices, while EU Member States typically apply price controls through various reimbursement schemes. It then examines how EU competition authorities have dealt with extraordinary price hikes, especially on old off-patent drugs and after acquisitions. Next, it examines the U.S. context, where, in the absence of a federal approach, States have considered non-antitrust measures such as rate setting and anti-price-gouging laws. Finally, the paper assesses the most consistent approach to extraordinary price increases in pharmaceutical markets and the role antitrust agencies should play.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.


