Mentalization,attachment,and subjective identity

In our opinion article we make a caveat about the hypothesis of a quantitative and a qualitative continuum along which mentalization may vary. For this idea risks not carving nature at its joints if it is not complemented with a “third-person” approach to mentalization, according to which the understanding of other minds both ontogenetically precedes and grounds the understanding of our own minds. In this perspective, we agree with Baglio & Marchetti’s claim that mentalization is “a multifaceted set of competences liable to influence -- and be influenced by -- a manifold of psychosocial aspects.” However, we propose it to be unpacked as follows: the construction of first-person mentalization evolves in an interplay of third-person mentalization, autobiographical memory and socio-communicative skills modulated by cultural variables. Our argumentation will be supported by evidence from developmental psychology, developmental social neuroscience, and psychopathology.