“Experimental Philosophy” is the use of the methods of cognitive sciences to answer empirical questions that are relevant to philosophical debates. In this article some important work in experimental philosophy is reviewed and two different interpretations of its metaphilosophical implications are discussed. The “reformists” see the findings of experimental philosophy as an essential completion of the method that consists in using intuitions about possible cases (thought experiments) as evidence in the evaluation of philosophical claims. In contrast, the “eliminativists” view the data from experimental philosophy as a death knell for the practice of the appeal to intuitions in philosophy. In both cases, it is argued, experimental philosophy is to be praised for making a further step in the establishment of the sort of naturalistic, scientifically engaged approach to philosophy that Quine promoted.
La "filosofia sperimentale" è l’uso dei metodi delle scienze cognitive per dare risposta a questioni empiriche che sono rilevanti per alcuni dibattiti filosofici. L’articolo esamina alcuni importanti lavori in filosofia sperimentale e discute due differenti interpretazioni delle sue implicazioni metafilosofiche: secondo i "riformisti" i risultati ottenuti dai filosofi sperimentali rappresentano un’integrazione indispensabile dell’impiego delle intuizioni prodotte in risposta a casi ipotetici (esperimenti mentali) quale base probativa per la valutazione di tesi filosofiche; secondo gli "eliminazionisti" i dati della filosofia sperimentale decretano la fine della prassi del ricorso alle intuizioni in filosofia. In ambedue i casi, si sostiene, il giudizio sulla filosofia sperimentale è positivo in quanto ulteriore tassello nel processo di affermazione della tradizione naturalistica quineana.
Marraffa, M. (2011). Esperimenti in filosofia. PARADIGMI(3), 153-172 [10.3280/PARA2011-003011].
Esperimenti in filosofia
MARRAFFA, MASSIMO
2011-01-01
Abstract
“Experimental Philosophy” is the use of the methods of cognitive sciences to answer empirical questions that are relevant to philosophical debates. In this article some important work in experimental philosophy is reviewed and two different interpretations of its metaphilosophical implications are discussed. The “reformists” see the findings of experimental philosophy as an essential completion of the method that consists in using intuitions about possible cases (thought experiments) as evidence in the evaluation of philosophical claims. In contrast, the “eliminativists” view the data from experimental philosophy as a death knell for the practice of the appeal to intuitions in philosophy. In both cases, it is argued, experimental philosophy is to be praised for making a further step in the establishment of the sort of naturalistic, scientifically engaged approach to philosophy that Quine promoted.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.