Di recente Peter Carruthers (2011) ha offerto solide ragioni in favore della tesi secondo cui la mentalizzazione in III persona ha una priorità funzionale ed evoluzionistica rispetto alla mentalizzazione in I persona. Tuttavia la teoria della conoscenza di sé di Carruthers non formula la previsione che la mentalizzazione in III persona precede ontogeneticamente la mentalizzazione in I persona. In questo articolo sosterremo, invece, che vi sono valide ragioni per ritenere che l’autodescrizione mentalistica (o identità soggettiva) del bambino si strutturi attraverso l’atto di volgere su se stessi la capacità di “leggere” le menti altrui; e che questo si determini in virtù di quella interazione socio-comunicativa fra bambino e caregiver che è oggetto di studio della teoria dell’attaccamento. La conclusione sarà che queste tesi vincolano fortemente la teorizzazione sulla relazione fra mentalizzazione e attaccamento.
Recently, Peter Carruthers [The opacity of mind: An integrative theory of self-knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011] has made a strong case for the claim that third-person mindreading has a functional and evolutionary priority over first-person mindreading. However, Carruthers’ model of self-knowledge does not predict that third-person mindreading is developmentally prior to first-person mindreading. In this article we shall argue, instead, that there are good reasons for thinking that the child’s mentalistic self-description (or subjective identity) develops through the act of turning on oneself the capacity to mindread other minds; and that this occurs through that socio-communicative interaction which is the subject of attachment theory. This claim puts strong constraints on theorizing about the relation between attachment and mentalization. We’ll argue that the implicit and automatic ability to mindread other minds is not a developmental achievement, but “an innate social-cognitive evolutionary adaptation implemented by a specialized and pre-wired mindreading mechanism that seems active and functional at least as early as 12 months of age in humans” (Gergely & Unoka, 2008, p. 58). An adaptation, therefore, independent of the attachment instinct system; this is tantamount to a refutation of the hypothesis of a direct ontogenetic causal and functional link between the quality of early infant attachment on the one hand, and the development of the ability for third-person mindreading on the other. When we take into consideration first-person mindreading, however, the relationship between attachment and mentalization is no longer a “facilitating” one: the child’s socio-communicative interaction with the caregiver becomes a necessary condition of the act of turning on oneself the capacity to mindread other minds. The approach to first-person mindreading is then more markedly socio-constructivist compared with the ability for third-person mindreading. Self-consciousness as introspective recognition of the presence of the virtual inner space of the mind, separated from the other two primary experiential spaces (i.e. the corporeal and extracorporeal spaces) is less neurocognitively guaranteed, if we may say so. Thus the subject constructs itself as psychologically self-conscious (and not only as physically self-conscious) in an interplay of mindreading, autobiographical memory, and socio-communicative capacities modulated by socio-cultural variables. The child who at 2-4 years of age turns his third person mind-reading capacities upon himself under the influence of caregivers’ mind-related talk, at around 4-5 years of age begins to grasp his subjective identity as rationalized in terms of autobiography. In this process of narrative self-construction, there is an essential psychodynamic ingredient: affective growth and construction of identity cannot be separated; the description of the self that from 2-3 years of age the child feverishly pursues is an “accepting description”, i.e., a description that is indissolubly cognitive (as definition of self) and emotional-affective (as acceptance of self). In brief, the child needs a clear and consistent capacity to describe itself, fully legitimized by the caregiver and socially valid. We conclude, therefore, that it is here, with regard to the construction and defense of a well-defined and interpersonally valid identity, that the idea of a direct ontogenetic causal and functional link between attachment and (first-person) mentalization finally finds its cogency.
Marraffa, M., Meini, C. (2015). La priorità della mentalizzazione in terza persona: implicazioni per la teoria dell’attaccamento. ATTACCAMENTO E SISTEMI COMPLESSI, 2(1), 45-64.
La priorità della mentalizzazione in terza persona: implicazioni per la teoria dell’attaccamento
MARRAFFA, MASSIMO;
2015-01-01
Abstract
Recently, Peter Carruthers [The opacity of mind: An integrative theory of self-knowledge. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011] has made a strong case for the claim that third-person mindreading has a functional and evolutionary priority over first-person mindreading. However, Carruthers’ model of self-knowledge does not predict that third-person mindreading is developmentally prior to first-person mindreading. In this article we shall argue, instead, that there are good reasons for thinking that the child’s mentalistic self-description (or subjective identity) develops through the act of turning on oneself the capacity to mindread other minds; and that this occurs through that socio-communicative interaction which is the subject of attachment theory. This claim puts strong constraints on theorizing about the relation between attachment and mentalization. We’ll argue that the implicit and automatic ability to mindread other minds is not a developmental achievement, but “an innate social-cognitive evolutionary adaptation implemented by a specialized and pre-wired mindreading mechanism that seems active and functional at least as early as 12 months of age in humans” (Gergely & Unoka, 2008, p. 58). An adaptation, therefore, independent of the attachment instinct system; this is tantamount to a refutation of the hypothesis of a direct ontogenetic causal and functional link between the quality of early infant attachment on the one hand, and the development of the ability for third-person mindreading on the other. When we take into consideration first-person mindreading, however, the relationship between attachment and mentalization is no longer a “facilitating” one: the child’s socio-communicative interaction with the caregiver becomes a necessary condition of the act of turning on oneself the capacity to mindread other minds. The approach to first-person mindreading is then more markedly socio-constructivist compared with the ability for third-person mindreading. Self-consciousness as introspective recognition of the presence of the virtual inner space of the mind, separated from the other two primary experiential spaces (i.e. the corporeal and extracorporeal spaces) is less neurocognitively guaranteed, if we may say so. Thus the subject constructs itself as psychologically self-conscious (and not only as physically self-conscious) in an interplay of mindreading, autobiographical memory, and socio-communicative capacities modulated by socio-cultural variables. The child who at 2-4 years of age turns his third person mind-reading capacities upon himself under the influence of caregivers’ mind-related talk, at around 4-5 years of age begins to grasp his subjective identity as rationalized in terms of autobiography. In this process of narrative self-construction, there is an essential psychodynamic ingredient: affective growth and construction of identity cannot be separated; the description of the self that from 2-3 years of age the child feverishly pursues is an “accepting description”, i.e., a description that is indissolubly cognitive (as definition of self) and emotional-affective (as acceptance of self). In brief, the child needs a clear and consistent capacity to describe itself, fully legitimized by the caregiver and socially valid. We conclude, therefore, that it is here, with regard to the construction and defense of a well-defined and interpersonally valid identity, that the idea of a direct ontogenetic causal and functional link between attachment and (first-person) mentalization finally finds its cogency.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
