Categorial ways of acting. Remarks on C. I. Lewis’s amendment of Kantian a priori.

This paper presents the “conceptual pragmatism” of C. I. Lewis as a useful epistemological orientation for studying the relationship between social and individual, in particular as it is set in Bourdieu’s sociology of practice. Bourdieu’s concepts of habits as based on 'social schematism' and of culture as a 'second nature’ as well as Lewis’ conception of logical schemas as constructed by human are built in the wake of Kant, and drawing a mediation between sensorial experience and conceptual level is a common issue for both Lewis and the French sociologist. The paper addresses such question discussing Lewis’ controversial idea of “sense meaning”, in order to show his commitment to provide a pragmatic, interactive theory of knowledge and language. Moreover, there is an emphasis on Lewis’ intertwining of conceptual schemas, actions and reality as a theoretical network positively accountable both for reshaping analysis of the relationship between sociality and individuality accordingly to pragmatist perspective, but also for implementing and improving Lewis’ commitment to observe, describe and interpret the effective functioning of conceptual schemas: a commitment that includes an option in favor of an externalist philosophical methodology which, in principle, tallies with the methodological attitude that mostly characterizes contemporary social sciences.