Disentangling the Self. An Outline of a General Theory of Self-Consciousness

In this article we explore the implications of a definition of self-consciousness as a process, by which we mean the self-representing of a multilevel system (the human organism) whose teleology is focused on self-defense. The first step in our investigation is the criticism of the notion of “prereflective self-consciousness”, an alleged minimal form of self-consciousness that is thought to be the non-conceptual, non-objectifying and non-representational basis of forms of self-consciousness that are cognitively more advanced, like those involved in mirror self-recognition, introspection, the proper use of the first-person pronoun, or the construction of a self-narrative. Our case against prereflective self-consciousness sets the stage for a developmental story about how a narrative identity is progressively constructed from body awareness, which becomes bodily self-awareness between 18 and 24 months of age. This paves the ground for an approach to narrative self-construction, which, drawing on findings in developmental, dynamic, social and personality psychology, aims to distance itself from the hermeneutical and eliminativistic forms of narrativism.