Benvenuti nell'Anagrafe della Ricerca d'Ateneo
La valutazione delle attività di ricerca che si svolgono nelle università ha assunto un'importanza rilevante sia per l'intero sistema universitario sia all'interno di ogni singolo ateneo. Roma Tre si è quindi dotata di idonei strumenti informativi in grado di supportare al meglio le azioni di monitoraggio e di valutazione delle attività di ricerca svolte nei propri dipartimentied ha realizzato una Anagrafe della Ricerca di Ateneo.
EnglishThis paper presents a model of competition between an incumbent and an entrant firm in telecommunications. The entrant has the option to enter the market with or without having preliminary invested in its own infrastructure; in case of facility based entry, the entrant has also the option to invest in the provision of enhanced services. In the case of resale based entry the entrant needs access to the incumbent network. Unlike the rival, the incumbent has always the option to upgrade the existing network to provide advanced services. We study the impact of access regulation on the type of entry and on firms' investments. We find that without regulation the incumbent sets the access charge to prevent resale based entry and this generates a social inefficient level of facility based entry. Access regulation may discourage welfare enhancing investments, thus also inducing a socially inefficient outcome. We extend the model to account for negotiated interconnection in the case of facilities based entry. (c) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Manenti, F.M., & Scialà, A. (2013). Access regulation, entry, and investment in telecommunications. TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY, 37(6-7), 450-468.
| Titolo: | Access regulation, entry, and investment in telecommunications |
| Autori: | |
| Data di pubblicazione: | 2013 |
| Rivista: | |
| Citazione: | Manenti, F.M., & Scialà, A. (2013). Access regulation, entry, and investment in telecommunications. TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY, 37(6-7), 450-468. |
| Abstract: | This paper presents a model of competition between an incumbent and an entrant firm in telecommunications. The entrant has the option to enter the market with or without having preliminary invested in its own infrastructure; in case of facility based entry, the entrant has also the option to invest in the provision of enhanced services. In the case of resale based entry the entrant needs access to the incumbent network. Unlike the rival, the incumbent has always the option to upgrade the existing network to provide advanced services. We study the impact of access regulation on the type of entry and on firms' investments. We find that without regulation the incumbent sets the access charge to prevent resale based entry and this generates a social inefficient level of facility based entry. Access regulation may discourage welfare enhancing investments, thus also inducing a socially inefficient outcome. We extend the model to account for negotiated interconnection in the case of facilities based entry. (c) 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. |
| Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11590/137446 |
| Appare nelle tipologie: | 1.1 Articolo in rivista |
File in questo prodotto:
http://hdl.handle.net/11590/137446
Copyright © 2020