The literature on the compatibility between the time of our experience—characterized by passage or becoming—and time as is represented within spacetime theories has been affected by a persistent failure to get a clear grasp of the notion of becoming, both in its relation to an ontology of events ‘‘spread’’ in a four-dimensional manifold, and in relation to temporally asymmetric physical processes. In the first part of my paper I try to remedy this situation by offering what I consider a clear and faithful explication of becoming, valid independently of the particular spacetime setting in which we operate. Along the way, I will show why the metaphysical debate between the so-called ‘‘presentists’’ and ‘‘eternalists’’ is completely irrelevant to the question of becoming, as the debate itself is generated by a failure to distinguish between a tensed and a tenseless sense of ‘‘existence’’. After a much needed distinction between absolute and relational becoming, I then show in what sense classical (nonquantum) spacetime physics presupposes both types of becoming, for the simple reason that spacetime physics presupposes an ontology of (timelike-separated) events. As a consequence, not only does it turn out that using physics to try to provide empirical evidence for the existence of becoming amounts to putting the cart before the horses, but also that the order imposed by ‘‘the arrow of becoming’’ is more fundamental than any other physical arrow of time, despite the fact that becoming cannot be used to explain why entropy grows, or retarded electromagnetic radiation prevails versus advanced radiation.

Dorato, M. (2006). Absolute becoming, relational becoming and the arrow of time: Some non conventional remarks on the relationship between physics and metaphysics. STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF MODERN PHYSICS, 37, 559-576 [10.1016/j.shpsb.2006.03.003].

Absolute becoming, relational becoming and the arrow of time: Some non conventional remarks on the relationship between physics and metaphysics

DORATO, Mauro
2006-01-01

Abstract

The literature on the compatibility between the time of our experience—characterized by passage or becoming—and time as is represented within spacetime theories has been affected by a persistent failure to get a clear grasp of the notion of becoming, both in its relation to an ontology of events ‘‘spread’’ in a four-dimensional manifold, and in relation to temporally asymmetric physical processes. In the first part of my paper I try to remedy this situation by offering what I consider a clear and faithful explication of becoming, valid independently of the particular spacetime setting in which we operate. Along the way, I will show why the metaphysical debate between the so-called ‘‘presentists’’ and ‘‘eternalists’’ is completely irrelevant to the question of becoming, as the debate itself is generated by a failure to distinguish between a tensed and a tenseless sense of ‘‘existence’’. After a much needed distinction between absolute and relational becoming, I then show in what sense classical (nonquantum) spacetime physics presupposes both types of becoming, for the simple reason that spacetime physics presupposes an ontology of (timelike-separated) events. As a consequence, not only does it turn out that using physics to try to provide empirical evidence for the existence of becoming amounts to putting the cart before the horses, but also that the order imposed by ‘‘the arrow of becoming’’ is more fundamental than any other physical arrow of time, despite the fact that becoming cannot be used to explain why entropy grows, or retarded electromagnetic radiation prevails versus advanced radiation.
2006
Dorato, M. (2006). Absolute becoming, relational becoming and the arrow of time: Some non conventional remarks on the relationship between physics and metaphysics. STUDIES IN HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF MODERN PHYSICS, 37, 559-576 [10.1016/j.shpsb.2006.03.003].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11590/139696
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