Le intuizioni di chi? Per un’epistemologia degli esperimenti di pensiero

I offer a short survey of the burgeoning literature on experimental philosophy, a new area of research that involves the gathering of empirical data to tackle philosophical problems. Following J. Alexander, R. Mallon, and J. Weinberg (“Accentuate the Negative.” Review of Philosophy and Psychology, 1, 3-4, 2010), I contrast two different interpretations of the metaphilosophical significance of the findings of experimental philosophy. According to a “positive” view, these findings are an essential completion of the method that consists in using intuitions about possible cases as evidence in the evaluation of philosophical claims (a standard practice in analytic philosophy). According to a “negative” conception, the data from experimental philosophy undermine the practice of the appeal to intuitions in philosophy. I conclude with some brief remarks on the implications of these two ways of doing experimental philosophy.