Are Zeno's Arguments Unsound Paradoxes?

Zeno’s arguments are generally regarded as ingenious but downright unsound paradoxes, worth of attention mainly to disclose why they go wrong or, alternatively, to recognise them as clever even if crude anticipations of modern views on space, on infinite or on the quantum conception of matter. In either case the arguments lose any connection with the scientific and philosophical problems of Zeno’s own time and environment. In this paper I argue that it is possible to make sense of Zeno’s arguments if we recognise that Zeno was indeed a close follower of Parmenides, who wanted to show that, if a plurality of beings existed, absurd consequences would follow. By doing so he intended to highlight the compact and inarticulate nature of being, and the human character of the system of world partitions producing the entities and the objects on which is based our knowledge.