Since 2001 the philosopher-neuroscientist Joshua Greene has developed a cognitive model of moral judgment in the context of the so-called “dual-processing accounts of human behavior”, a family of theories that have in common the distinction between cognitive processes that are fast, automatic, and unconscious and those that are slow, deliberative, and conscious. In section 1, I will introduce Greene’s model, together with some experimental evidence that he offers in support of it; then, in section 2, I will examine experimental findings that challenge the model; finally, in section 3, I will reject the antagonistic view of emotions underlying Greene’s cognitive theory of moral judgment.
Marraffa M (2014). Emozioni e razionalità: oltre il modello 'antagonistico'. SISTEMI INTELLIGENTI, XXVI(1).
Titolo: | Emozioni e razionalità: oltre il modello 'antagonistico' | |
Autori: | ||
Data di pubblicazione: | 2014 | |
Rivista: | ||
Citazione: | Marraffa M (2014). Emozioni e razionalità: oltre il modello 'antagonistico'. SISTEMI INTELLIGENTI, XXVI(1). | |
Abstract: | Since 2001 the philosopher-neuroscientist Joshua Greene has developed a cognitive model of moral judgment in the context of the so-called “dual-processing accounts of human behavior”, a family of theories that have in common the distinction between cognitive processes that are fast, automatic, and unconscious and those that are slow, deliberative, and conscious. In section 1, I will introduce Greene’s model, together with some experimental evidence that he offers in support of it; then, in section 2, I will examine experimental findings that challenge the model; finally, in section 3, I will reject the antagonistic view of emotions underlying Greene’s cognitive theory of moral judgment. | |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11590/144515 | |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 1.1 Articolo in rivista |