Varieties of Synechism. Peirce and James on Mind-World Continuity

Within the most recent philosophical discussions on the fascinating and controversial issue of the continuity/difference between human beings and natural world, there is a widespread tendency to maintain an idea of natural continuity which calls forth the Brunian notion of universe-life. According to this notion, the distinction between Mind and World or their qualitative difference are rejected, and the necessity of natural conditions to the evolution of the specific human phenomenon is claimed . This philosophic view shares J. Dewey’s criticism of traditional philosophical «false antithesis» and therefore calls for a deep attention to the logical-semantic categories implied by the continuity argument. The anti-dichotomic commitment gives light on the naturalistic vein of the classical pragmatism and its relationship with Darwin’s theory of evolution. This essay analyzes Peirce’s theory of continuum and its strict connection with the fallibilistic criterion of knowledge, emphasizing peirceian suggestion to consider the differences between phenomena in terms of dynamic expressions of Nature and not as ontological breaks. This approach is compared with W. James’ metaphysical hypothesis of neutral monism, and also with H. Putnam non-reductionist naturalism that get back to classical pragmatism, in particular to James’s thought, thanks to its characteristic realistic claim, its emphasis on the epistemic value of social and practical dimension, and its anti-dichotomic commitment.