This paper introduces a contract between the government and trade unions in a model of strategic wage bargaining à la Lippi (2003). It shows that an optimal contract can be implemented through an appropriately defined inflation target.

Cavallari, L. (2012). Optimal contracts and the role of the government in wage bargaining. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 115, 160-163.

Optimal contracts and the role of the government in wage bargaining

CAVALLARI, Lilia
2012

Abstract

This paper introduces a contract between the government and trade unions in a model of strategic wage bargaining à la Lippi (2003). It shows that an optimal contract can be implemented through an appropriately defined inflation target.
Cavallari, L. (2012). Optimal contracts and the role of the government in wage bargaining. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 115, 160-163.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11590/151874
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