This paper introduces a contract between the government and trade unions in a model of strategic wage bargaining à la Lippi (2003). It shows that an optimal contract can be implemented through an appropriately defined inflation target.
Cavallari, L. (2012). Optimal contracts and the role of the government in wage bargaining. ECONOMICS LETTERS, 115, 160-163.
Optimal contracts and the role of the government in wage bargaining
CAVALLARI, Lilia
2012-01-01
Abstract
This paper introduces a contract between the government and trade unions in a model of strategic wage bargaining à la Lippi (2003). It shows that an optimal contract can be implemented through an appropriately defined inflation target.File in questo prodotto:
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