This article contrasts two different kinds of account of our knowledge of our own thoughts. According to standard theories, self-knowledge of at least a subset of thoughts is direct and non-interpretive. According to the alternative, which will be elaborated and defended here, self-knowledge results from turning our mindreading capacities on ourselves, relying on the same sensory channels that we employ for other-knowledge and utilizing many of the same sensory cues.
Marraffa M (2014). Mindreading the Self. SISTEMI INTELLIGENTI, 26(1).
Titolo: | Mindreading the Self | |
Autori: | ||
Data di pubblicazione: | 2014 | |
Rivista: | ||
Citazione: | Marraffa M (2014). Mindreading the Self. SISTEMI INTELLIGENTI, 26(1). | |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11590/157889 | |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 1.6 Traduzione in rivista |
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.
I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.