The problems that exist in relating quantum mechanical phenomena to classical concepts like properties, causes, or entities like particles or waves are well-known and still open to question, so that there is not yet an agreement on what kind of metaphysics lies at the foundations of quantum mechanics. However, physicists constantly use the formal resources of quantum mechanics in order to explain quantum phenomena. The structural account of explanation, therefore, tries to account for this kind of mathematical explanation in physics, and hinges on the following claims: (i) scientific models are central in scientific explanation; (ii) in some cases the relevant information for the explanation/understanding of a phenomenon P consists in the sole structural properties of the (models displayed by the) theory; (iii) in these cases, the interpretation of the formalism in terms of a categorial framework is unessential for the explanation of P and a mathematical model can be at the base of an objective and effective scientific explanation. The present paper will carry a reflection about some issues arising from R.I.G. Hughes and Robert Clifton’s works in the attempt to outline some details of structural explanation.
Felline, L. (2010). Remarks on a Structural Account of Scientific Explanation. In EPSA Philosophical Issues in the Sciences. Launch of the European Philosophy of Science Association (pp. 43-53). Springer Netherlands [10.1007/978-90-481-3252-2_5].
Remarks on a Structural Account of Scientific Explanation
FELLINE, LAURA
2010-01-01
Abstract
The problems that exist in relating quantum mechanical phenomena to classical concepts like properties, causes, or entities like particles or waves are well-known and still open to question, so that there is not yet an agreement on what kind of metaphysics lies at the foundations of quantum mechanics. However, physicists constantly use the formal resources of quantum mechanics in order to explain quantum phenomena. The structural account of explanation, therefore, tries to account for this kind of mathematical explanation in physics, and hinges on the following claims: (i) scientific models are central in scientific explanation; (ii) in some cases the relevant information for the explanation/understanding of a phenomenon P consists in the sole structural properties of the (models displayed by the) theory; (iii) in these cases, the interpretation of the formalism in terms of a categorial framework is unessential for the explanation of P and a mathematical model can be at the base of an objective and effective scientific explanation. The present paper will carry a reflection about some issues arising from R.I.G. Hughes and Robert Clifton’s works in the attempt to outline some details of structural explanation.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
