In 1985, G.H. von Wright entrusted to a long essay entitled Of Human Freedom the results of a deep reworking of the problems of intentional action, which he would later describe as “a new opening” in his philosophical itinerary. The importance of this essay in the context of von Wright’s later thought is not just due to the fact that it represents the arrival point of the arguments developed in earlier works regarding the compatibility between free action and natural necessity. It is also the departure point for a solution to the problem of congruence (or parallelism) between mind and matter, which would be at the center of his writings contained in his last book, In the Shadow of Descartes. Essays in the Philosophy of Mind (1998). This paper examines the gradual shift in the center of gravity of von Wright’s interests from practical philosophy to the philosophy of the mind, which documents precisely the “new opening” in his thinking which he announced in the 1985 essay. In order to understand the reasons for the passage between apparently heterogeneous areas of research, it is necessary to clarify first of all how the version of compatibilism defended by von Wright in Of Human Freedom constitutes none other than a corollary of his dynamic concept of intentional action, understood as the possibility of human intervention on the external world, and the origin of a change or non change of natural reality. In the second part of the paper “the paradox” of the self-determinated actions as a consequence of the congruence between the mental and the bodily aspects of the human agency will be discussed. In human action these two aspects are conceptually congruent; that is, they do not contradict each other, they are logically compatible. In this sense they, literally, attain harmony. But once again this harmony carries a high price, namely, accepting the paradox that it involves, i.e. the paradox of a reality that is neither mind nor matter and that is both mind and matter.

Egidi, M.R. (2005). G.H.von WRIGHT on SELF-Determination and Free Agency, 77, 105-14.

G.H.von WRIGHT on SELF-Determination and Free Agency

EGIDI, Maria Rosaria
2005-01-01

Abstract

In 1985, G.H. von Wright entrusted to a long essay entitled Of Human Freedom the results of a deep reworking of the problems of intentional action, which he would later describe as “a new opening” in his philosophical itinerary. The importance of this essay in the context of von Wright’s later thought is not just due to the fact that it represents the arrival point of the arguments developed in earlier works regarding the compatibility between free action and natural necessity. It is also the departure point for a solution to the problem of congruence (or parallelism) between mind and matter, which would be at the center of his writings contained in his last book, In the Shadow of Descartes. Essays in the Philosophy of Mind (1998). This paper examines the gradual shift in the center of gravity of von Wright’s interests from practical philosophy to the philosophy of the mind, which documents precisely the “new opening” in his thinking which he announced in the 1985 essay. In order to understand the reasons for the passage between apparently heterogeneous areas of research, it is necessary to clarify first of all how the version of compatibilism defended by von Wright in Of Human Freedom constitutes none other than a corollary of his dynamic concept of intentional action, understood as the possibility of human intervention on the external world, and the origin of a change or non change of natural reality. In the second part of the paper “the paradox” of the self-determinated actions as a consequence of the congruence between the mental and the bodily aspects of the human agency will be discussed. In human action these two aspects are conceptually congruent; that is, they do not contradict each other, they are logically compatible. In this sense they, literally, attain harmony. But once again this harmony carries a high price, namely, accepting the paradox that it involves, i.e. the paradox of a reality that is neither mind nor matter and that is both mind and matter.
2005
Egidi, M.R. (2005). G.H.von WRIGHT on SELF-Determination and Free Agency, 77, 105-14.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11590/269822
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