In this paper, we focus on two related reductive theses in metaphysics—Humean Supervenience and Composition as Identity—and on their status in light of the indications coming from science, in particular quantum mechanics. While defenders of these reductive theses claim that they can be updated so as to resist the quantum evidence, we provide arguments against this contention. We claim that physics gives us reason for thinking that both Humean Supervenience and Composition as Identity are at least contingently false, as the very process of composition determines, at least in some cases, the nature of composed systems. The argument has essentially to do with the fact that denying the reductive theses in question allows one to provide better explanations for the quantum evidence
Morganti, M., & Claudio, C. (2016). Humean Supervenience, Composition as Identity and Quantum Wholes. ERKENNTNIS, 81(6), 1173-1194.
|Titolo:||Humean Supervenience, Composition as Identity and Quantum Wholes|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2016|
|Citazione:||Morganti, M., & Claudio, C. (2016). Humean Supervenience, Composition as Identity and Quantum Wholes. ERKENNTNIS, 81(6), 1173-1194.|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|