We study self-selection into politics and effort once in office of citizens with different abilities and motivations in a framework where moonlighting is allowed. We find that high-ability motivated (public-fit) politicians exert higher effort in politics than high-ability non-motivated (market-fit) politicians, and that high-ability citizens, both public-fit and market-fit, may decide to enter politics. We test our predictions using a database of Italian parliamentarians for the period 1996-2006. We find evidence of advantageous selection of both market-fit and public-fit parliamentarians. We also show that public-fit parliamentarians have higher voting attendance and that only voting attendance of market-fit parliamentarians is negatively affected by income opportunities.
Fedele, A., & Naticchioni, P. (2015). Moonlighting Politicians: Motivation Matters!. GERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, n/a-n/a.
|Titolo:||Moonlighting Politicians: Motivation Matters!|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2015|
|Citazione:||Fedele, A., & Naticchioni, P. (2015). Moonlighting Politicians: Motivation Matters!. GERMAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, n/a-n/a.|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|