The problem of free will is deeply linked with the causal relevance of mental events. The caus-al exclusion argumentclaims that, in order to be causally relevant, mental events must be identical to phys-ical events. However, Gibb has recently criticized it,suggesting that mental events are causally relevant as double preventers. For Gibb, mental events enable physical effects to take place by preventing other men-tal events from preventing a behaviour to take place. The role of mental double preventers is hence simi-lar to what Libet names free won’t, namely the ability toveto an action initiated unconsciously by the brain. In this paper I will propose an argument against Gibb’s account, the causal irrelevance argument, showing that Gibb’s proposal doesnot overcome the objection of systematic overdetermination of causal relevance, because mental double preventers systematically overdetermine physical double preventers, and therefore mental events are causally irrelevant.
|Titolo:||The Metaphysics of Free Will: A Critique of Free Won’t as Double Prevention|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2015|
|Citazione:||Grasso, M. (2015). The Metaphysics of Free Will: A Critique of Free Won’t as Double Prevention. RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA E PSICOLOGIA, 6(1), 120-129.|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|