On aisthesis and genesis in the first definition of episteme in the Theaetetus. The exegetical background of this paper is based on two assumptions. Firstly, the Theaetetus is conceived as an ontological examination of the sensible world; secondly, the aim of this examination is to test the descriptive and semantic faculty of language. The paper consists in the analysis of some ontological issues of the first definition of episteme, i.e., aisthesis and genesis. The way the sensible world is conceived results from the prominence given to the meaning of sensible as experiential as such, especially by recognizing it as the ontological domain of events and factuality. The paper is composed of three sections: a brief statement of the exegetical presupposition is followed by a second sec- tion, devoted to the analysis and translation of the Greek concepts of aisthesis, genesis and phantasia. It aims to show that aisthesis does not correspond to per- ception, but to experience in a wider sense, whereas genenis is the name of the ontological dimension of events and phantasia is the link to phenomenality and manifestation. The last section provides the exposition and explanation of the ontology of event, seen under the strongest Heraclitean constraint, which brings the concept of phenomenalism to the extreme limit.
|Titolo:||Su aisthesis e genesis nella prima definizione di episteme nel Teeteto|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2015|
|Citazione:||Giovannetti, L. (2015). Su aisthesis e genesis nella prima definizione di episteme nel Teeteto. FOGLI DI FILOSOFIA(6), 33-51.|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|