The Case-Law of International Criminal Tribunals in the Two-Year Period 2005-2006

A notable feature of International and ‘‘Hybrid’’ Criminal Tribunals’ case-law in the 2005-2006 period is their sustained effort to be in keeping with one another, as well as with other international Courts’ jurisprudence. Each ad hoc Criminal Tribunal expressly followed the solutions given in the other‘s previous case-law dealing with identical or similar issues and in the case-law of other international human rights judicial organs as well. Where occasionally a different conclusion was reached, ad hoc Criminal Tribunals proved to be greatly concerned with providing a justification based on objective differences in their Statutes and Rules of Procedure and Evidence (3). The same holds true for the International Criminal Court and for Hybrid Criminal Tribunals, which drew heavily on the ad hocTribunals’ case-law. The International Court of Justice, in turn, has recently shown to be prepared to rely strongly on the findings of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Jugoslavia. All this clearly proves that, although some differences and specific problems occasionally arise and justify dissimilar conclusions, the problem of ‘‘fragmentation’’ of internationallaw lately discussed in the ILC Study Group’s Report submitted to the UN General Assembly in 2006 is far more speculative than practical, at least as far as this important part of international practice is concerned. This essay focuses on the major issues in the Criminal Tribunals’ judicial activities in the two-year period 2005-2006 and is articulated into three sections, dedicated to ad hoc Criminal Tribunals, i.e. the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), to the International Criminal Court (ICC) and to ‘‘Hybrid’’ Criminal Tribunals respectively.