The present paper argues that the typical structuralist claims according to which invariances, symmetries and the like are fundamental – especially in physics – should not be understood in terms of physical relations being fundamental. Rather, they should be understood in terms of ‘metaphysical coherentism’ - the idea that object-like parts of reality exhibit symmetric relations of ontological dependence. The view is developed in some detail, in particular by showing that i) symmetric ontological dependence does not necessarily lead to uninformative metaphysical explanations, and ii) metaphysical coherentism strikes the best balance between the requirements of naturalism and those of theoretical consistency – especially in view of the difficulties that structuralists seem to have in accounting for all state-independent properties of particles in relational terms. On this basis, the coherentist picture is applied to the interpretation of the quantum domain, and contrasted with extant varieties of structuralism, of both the eliminative and the non-eliminative sort, and holism.
Morganti, M. (2019). From Ontic Structural Realism to Metaphysical Coherentism. EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, 9(1).
|Titolo:||From Ontic Structural Realism to Metaphysical Coherentism|
|Data di pubblicazione:||2019|
|Citazione:||Morganti, M. (2019). From Ontic Structural Realism to Metaphysical Coherentism. EUROPEAN JOURNAL FOR PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE, 9(1).|
|Appare nelle tipologie:||1.1 Articolo in rivista|