Critica sociale e conoscenza

In the first generation of the Frankfurt School, critical theory was promoting a strong interconnection between social critique and knowledge of the social world. Just as Marx considered that a critique of capitalism was impossible without a systematic knowledge of its laws, transformations and contradictions, so too Horkheimer and Adorno were convinced that social critique should be grounded on social theory. It is simply a fact that in contemporary critical theory, such a conviction does not play a role anymore. Critical theory has not only subjected itself to the division of intellectual labor in separate disciplines, becoming more and more a philosophical sub-discipline distinct from the social sciences. It has also conceived itself more and more as belonging to the genre of ìnormative political philosophy’, focusing its efforts more and more exclusively on the issue of normative foundation of social critique. and consequently, it has lost interest in epistemological discussions. The purpose of this article is to cast doubt on this broad consensus about the legitimacy of such a divorce between social critique and knowledge. In order to work toward this goal, I proceed in four steps. In a first step, I recall the ways in which the philosophical debate about social critique is currently articulated and how it disconnects social critique and knowledge. The three other steps consider the two main justifications for a disconnection between social critique and knowledge. In fact, critical theory focuses on the normative foundation of social critique by virtue of two main reasons. The first one relates to a vision of politics as consisting mainly in a conflict between normative principles, notably between conceptions of social justice. I criticize this vision of politics in the second step of this paper. The second reason relates to the criticism of the naturalist fallacy. The knowledge of the social world cannot play a decisive role in a discussion concerning the legitimacy of competing conceptions of social justice, so the argument runs, since the is should not be confused the ought. In the third step of the paper, I try to show that this argument run the risk of worsening epistemic injustices, and in the fourth step, I elaborate a conception of normativity that bridges the gap between the is and the ought.