The credit sector has always been a sector subject to penetrating public intervention due to the specificity of the activity carried out and the systemic importance of the interests underlying it. However, the intensity of public intervention has changed over time, mainly because of the pressure from the European Union, first with a view to openness and competitiveness of markets, then, after the crisis of 2008, for the purpose of guaranteeing the stability of the system. After the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis, there has been a rethink of the rules on the credit system. In particular, new and sharper constraints on entrepreneurial autonomy have been introduced, the supervisory functions have been assigned to the ECB and a new banking crisis regulation has been introduced which significantly limits the bank’s choices. This had inevitable effects on the relationship between public power and banking enterprise and on the connected relationship between authority and freedom, modifying the balances that had been consolidated until the crisis. The essay investigates this new relationship in order to ascertain how public supervision of credit institutions configures itself today.
DEL GATTO, S. (2019). IL BILANCIAMENTO TRA INTERVENTO PUBBLICO E LIBERTÀ DI IMPRESA NELLA REGOLAZIONE DELLE BANCHE. RIVISTA DELLA REGOLAZIONE DEI MERCATI(1).
IL BILANCIAMENTO TRA INTERVENTO PUBBLICO E LIBERTÀ DI IMPRESA NELLA REGOLAZIONE DELLE BANCHE
SVEVA DEL GATTO
2019-01-01
Abstract
The credit sector has always been a sector subject to penetrating public intervention due to the specificity of the activity carried out and the systemic importance of the interests underlying it. However, the intensity of public intervention has changed over time, mainly because of the pressure from the European Union, first with a view to openness and competitiveness of markets, then, after the crisis of 2008, for the purpose of guaranteeing the stability of the system. After the outbreak of the financial and economic crisis, there has been a rethink of the rules on the credit system. In particular, new and sharper constraints on entrepreneurial autonomy have been introduced, the supervisory functions have been assigned to the ECB and a new banking crisis regulation has been introduced which significantly limits the bank’s choices. This had inevitable effects on the relationship between public power and banking enterprise and on the connected relationship between authority and freedom, modifying the balances that had been consolidated until the crisis. The essay investigates this new relationship in order to ascertain how public supervision of credit institutions configures itself today.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
