Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clauses have long been a controversial issue in antitrust. Whereas there is established literature on traditional MFN clauses, the same cannot be said for platform MFNs. Despite the number of cases over recent years, no consensus has been reached either by competition agencies or by scholars on the competitive effects of platform MFNs. In particular, in the EU, where several investigations have been conducted, a clear indication on the approach guiding the enforcement on such clauses is still lacking and inconsistencies exist between Member States, thereby undermining legal and business certainty.
Colangelo, M. (2019). Traditional and Platform MFN Clauses under Antitrust Law: Insights from Recent Practice. COMPETITION POLICY INTERNATIONAL(September 2019), 1-9.
Traditional and Platform MFN Clauses under Antitrust Law: Insights from Recent Practice
Colangelo Margherita
2019-01-01
Abstract
Most Favoured Nation (MFN) clauses have long been a controversial issue in antitrust. Whereas there is established literature on traditional MFN clauses, the same cannot be said for platform MFNs. Despite the number of cases over recent years, no consensus has been reached either by competition agencies or by scholars on the competitive effects of platform MFNs. In particular, in the EU, where several investigations have been conducted, a clear indication on the approach guiding the enforcement on such clauses is still lacking and inconsistencies exist between Member States, thereby undermining legal and business certainty.I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.
