This essay moves from the increasing fear of anti‐system (and far-right) parties in Italy (e.g., CasaPound Italia and Forza Nuova), but believing that an indiscriminate criminal response cannot be the most appropriate solution for the security requests coming from citizens. The paper analyses Article XII of the Transitory and Final Provisions of the Italian Constitution, that forbids «the reorganization of the dissolved fascist party» and the laws approved to enforce that prohibition (punishing apology of fascism and usual manifestations of fascism too); several judgements of Italian Courts are considered, in order to verify their attitude over sixty years after the Constitution came into force. The paper also compares the Italian case with Germany. After the II World War, it was configured as a “militant democracy”, but in 2017 the Bundesverfassungsgericht decided not to apply the Parteiverbot (party ban) for the National Democratic Party of Germany, judging it “anticonstitutional”, but not unconstitutional; after that judgement, Article 21 of the Grundgesetz has been modified, excluding these kind of parties from tate financing without banning them. The “German choice” (democracycan decide not to protect itself) is an opportunity to evaluate the different decisions made in Italy, increasing and widening criminal sanctions against neo‐fascist episodes and movements without modifying the Constitution.

Maestri, G. (2019). Paura dei partiti antisistema e scelte sulla “protezione” della democrazia, tra Italia e Germania. DEMOCRAZIA E SICUREZZA, 9(2), 3-111.

Paura dei partiti antisistema e scelte sulla “protezione” della democrazia, tra Italia e Germania

Gabriele Maestri
2019-01-01

Abstract

This essay moves from the increasing fear of anti‐system (and far-right) parties in Italy (e.g., CasaPound Italia and Forza Nuova), but believing that an indiscriminate criminal response cannot be the most appropriate solution for the security requests coming from citizens. The paper analyses Article XII of the Transitory and Final Provisions of the Italian Constitution, that forbids «the reorganization of the dissolved fascist party» and the laws approved to enforce that prohibition (punishing apology of fascism and usual manifestations of fascism too); several judgements of Italian Courts are considered, in order to verify their attitude over sixty years after the Constitution came into force. The paper also compares the Italian case with Germany. After the II World War, it was configured as a “militant democracy”, but in 2017 the Bundesverfassungsgericht decided not to apply the Parteiverbot (party ban) for the National Democratic Party of Germany, judging it “anticonstitutional”, but not unconstitutional; after that judgement, Article 21 of the Grundgesetz has been modified, excluding these kind of parties from tate financing without banning them. The “German choice” (democracycan decide not to protect itself) is an opportunity to evaluate the different decisions made in Italy, increasing and widening criminal sanctions against neo‐fascist episodes and movements without modifying the Constitution.
2019
Maestri, G. (2019). Paura dei partiti antisistema e scelte sulla “protezione” della democrazia, tra Italia e Germania. DEMOCRAZIA E SICUREZZA, 9(2), 3-111.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11590/366106
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