Bonicalzi, S. (2015). Does reductivist event-causal compatibilism leave anything out? Lynne Baker’s reflective-endorsement and the bounds of the traditional analyses of moral responsibility. PHENOMENOLOGY AND MIND, 7, 128-135.

Does reductivist event-causal compatibilism leave anything out? Lynne Baker’s reflective-endorsement and the bounds of the traditional analyses of moral responsibility

sofia bonicalzi
2015-01-01

Bonicalzi, S. (2015). Does reductivist event-causal compatibilism leave anything out? Lynne Baker’s reflective-endorsement and the bounds of the traditional analyses of moral responsibility. PHENOMENOLOGY AND MIND, 7, 128-135.
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: https://hdl.handle.net/11590/396466
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