An established tenet of the literature isthat the use of flexible labor leads to less innovation. Yet, less attention has been paid to the possibility that it is the decision to innovate that generates the incentive to hire on a permanent basis. The goal of this paper is to show the existence of interlocking complementarities between the firm’s technological and hiring strategies. To do so, we develop a simple model where the workers’ decision to invest in human capital is affected by the type of employment contract (temporary versus permanent) and by the type of technological investments (routine versus innovative). When the firm is unable to coordinate its actions across these different domains, two equilibria simultaneously exist: in the ‘high-road’ equilibrium, firms invest more in innovative projects and hire on a permanent basis; in the ‘low-road’ equilibrium, they invest more in routine projects and hire on a temporary basis.

Dughera, S., Quatraro, F., & Vittori, C. (2021). Innovation, on-the-job learning, and labor contracts: an organizational equilibria approach. JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS, 1-16 [10.1017/S174413742100049].

Innovation, on-the-job learning, and labor contracts: an organizational equilibria approach

Vittori C
2021

Abstract

An established tenet of the literature isthat the use of flexible labor leads to less innovation. Yet, less attention has been paid to the possibility that it is the decision to innovate that generates the incentive to hire on a permanent basis. The goal of this paper is to show the existence of interlocking complementarities between the firm’s technological and hiring strategies. To do so, we develop a simple model where the workers’ decision to invest in human capital is affected by the type of employment contract (temporary versus permanent) and by the type of technological investments (routine versus innovative). When the firm is unable to coordinate its actions across these different domains, two equilibria simultaneously exist: in the ‘high-road’ equilibrium, firms invest more in innovative projects and hire on a permanent basis; in the ‘low-road’ equilibrium, they invest more in routine projects and hire on a temporary basis.
Dughera, S., Quatraro, F., & Vittori, C. (2021). Innovation, on-the-job learning, and labor contracts: an organizational equilibria approach. JOURNAL OF INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS, 1-16 [10.1017/S174413742100049].
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Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11590/398409
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