Artificial intelligences and robots increasingly mimic human mental powers and intelligent behaviour. However, many authors claim that ascribing human mental powers to them is both conceptually mistaken and morally dangerous. This article defends the view that artificial intelligences can have human-like mental powers, by claiming that both human and artificial minds can be seen as extended minds – along the lines of Chalmers and Clark’s view of mind and cognition. The main idea of this article is that the Extended Mind Model is independently plausible and can easily be extended to artificial intelligences, providing a solid base for concluding that artificial intelligences possess minds. This may warrant viewing them as morally responsible agents.
Pellegrino, G., & Garasic, M.D. (2020). Artificial intelligences as extended minds. Why not?. RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA E PSICOLOGIA, 11(2), 150-168 [10.4453/rifp.2020.0010].
Titolo: | Artificial intelligences as extended minds. Why not? | |
Autori: | ||
Data di pubblicazione: | 2020 | |
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Citazione: | Pellegrino, G., & Garasic, M.D. (2020). Artificial intelligences as extended minds. Why not?. RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI FILOSOFIA E PSICOLOGIA, 11(2), 150-168 [10.4453/rifp.2020.0010]. | |
Handle: | http://hdl.handle.net/11590/402468 | |
Appare nelle tipologie: | 1.1 Articolo in rivista |