Do government parties positively discriminate in favor of swing or aligned sub-national units while allocating public resources? This paper integrates these two strands of the literature and makes a new contribution by incorporating the insightful perspective of the political fragmentation approach. Using a dataset of Italian regions between 2001 and 2011 constructed from primary sources and a new index of fractionalization, based on Golosov (Party Politics 16(2):171–192), we empirically find that it is the fragmentation of the aligned recipient government that affects the final amount of resources, rather than the alignment itself. Quasi-formula-based grants do not remove the arbitrariness that allows for politically motivated targeting.

Auteri, M., Cattel, A. (2022). Political Fragmentation and Coalition Alignment effects: Evidence from health Transfers to Italian Regions. ITALIAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL [10.1007/s40797-022-00205-3].

Political Fragmentation and Coalition Alignment effects: Evidence from health Transfers to Italian Regions

Auteri, Monica
Conceptualization
;
Cattel, Alessandro
Data Curation
2022

Abstract

Do government parties positively discriminate in favor of swing or aligned sub-national units while allocating public resources? This paper integrates these two strands of the literature and makes a new contribution by incorporating the insightful perspective of the political fragmentation approach. Using a dataset of Italian regions between 2001 and 2011 constructed from primary sources and a new index of fractionalization, based on Golosov (Party Politics 16(2):171–192), we empirically find that it is the fragmentation of the aligned recipient government that affects the final amount of resources, rather than the alignment itself. Quasi-formula-based grants do not remove the arbitrariness that allows for politically motivated targeting.
Auteri, M., Cattel, A. (2022). Political Fragmentation and Coalition Alignment effects: Evidence from health Transfers to Italian Regions. ITALIAN ECONOMIC JOURNAL [10.1007/s40797-022-00205-3].
File in questo prodotto:
Non ci sono file associati a questo prodotto.

I documenti in IRIS sono protetti da copyright e tutti i diritti sono riservati, salvo diversa indicazione.

Utilizza questo identificativo per citare o creare un link a questo documento: http://hdl.handle.net/11590/415487
Citazioni
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.pmc??? ND
  • Scopus ND
  • ???jsp.display-item.citation.isi??? ND
social impact