Free Will: A Pseudo-Problem? Schlick on a Longstanding Metaphysical and Ethical Debate

Free will, famously described by David Hume as “the most contentious question of metaphysics, the most contentious science”, has long been a subject of intense debate, particularly regarding its compatibility with a deterministic universe and its implications for ethical questions, notably moral responsibility. Moritz Schlick, a leading figure in the Vienna Circle and the neopositivist movement, challenges the validity of this debate, asserting that it arises from linguistic and semantic confusions surrounding terms like ‘freedom’, ‘determinism’, and ‘will’. Reflecting the neopositivist disdain for metaphysics and normative ethics, Schlick posits that once these concepts are properly defined, the problem of free will dissolves, though addressing it may be necessary when discussing moral and legal responsibility. This paper aims to elucidate Schlick’s perspective on free will and responsibility, placing it within the early 20th-century debate, and highlighting his efforts to reconcile these concepts with the principles of physics while avoiding theoretical ambiguities.